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African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism

Terrorism

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African Union

Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 544th meeting on the situation in Mali and the Sahel region in general

18 September 2015



The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 544th meeting held on 18 September 2015, adopted the following decision on the situation in Mali and the Sahel region in general:

Council,

1. Takes note of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in Mali [PSC/PR/2.(DXLIV)] and the efforts made by the AU in the area of peace and security in the Sahelo-Saharan region. Council also takes note of the statements made by the Permanent Representative of Mali to the AU, as well as by the representatives of the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) Secretariat and the following permanent members of the UN Security Council: France, United Kingdom and United States of America;
2. Reiterates its commitment to the respect of the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Mali, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the AU Constitutive Act;
3. Recalls its previous communiques and press statements on the situation in Mali and the Sahelo-Saharan region, including press statement PSC/BR.(DXIII) adopted at its 513th meeting, held on 3 June 2015;

4. Reiterates its full support to the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali emanating from the Algiers Process, signed by the Government of the Republic of Mali, the Movements of the Algiers Platform and the Mediation led by Algeria, Chef de file, and comprising the neighboring countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria), international organizations (UN, AU, Economic Community of West African States - ECOWAS, EU and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation - OIC), in Bamako, on 15 May 2015, as well as by the Coordination of the Movements of Azawad (CMA), also in Bamako, on 20 June 2015. Council reiterates its appreciation to President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita for his continuous commitment to peace and reconciliation in Mali;

5. Stresses once again that the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation is a balanced document that takes into account the legitimate concerns of all the parties, based on the respect of the unity and territorial integrity of Mali, as well as of the secular nature and the republican form of the State. Council further stresses that the effective implementation of the Agreement will make it possible to resolve, in a lasting manner, the crises that have regularly affected the northern part of Mali and to further isolate the terrorist and criminal elements present in this part of the country;

6. Welcomes the establishment of the Follow-up Committee of the Agreement (CSA) and the efforts made by Algeria and the other members of the CSA to facilitate the implementation process of the Agreement and strict compliance by the parties with their commitments. Council notes with satisfaction that the CSA has already met three times and has established its technical sub-committees in charge of political and institutional matters, defense and security, development, as well as on justice, reconciliation and humanitarian issues. Council urges the CSA to persevere in its efforts, including by adopting, as quickly as possible, the detailed calendar for the implementation of the Agreement;

7. Expresses its deep concern about the difficulties facing the launching of the implementation process of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, in particular as a result of the incidents which occurred in mid-August 2015 in Anefis, in the region of Kidal, with the clashes opposing the Movements of the Platform and the CMA. Council strongly condemns those clashes, which constitute a flagrant violation of the Agreement. Council takes note of the withdrawal of the Movements of the Platform from this locality and requests the UN Multinational Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to ensure that the modalities agreed upon with regard to this withdrawal are scrupulously respected;

8. Demands that all the parties concerned scrupulously honour the commitments made and reiterates its determination to impose sanctions against all those who impede the implementation of the Agreement and to seek, in this regard, the support of the UN Security Council and other members of the international community;

9. Urges the international community to provide all the necessary support to the

implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, including the mobilization of the necessary financial resources and technical support for the implementation of the envisaged development programs for northern Mali. Council also appeals for the mobilization of the necessary funds to ensure the proper functioning of the CSA and its sub-committees;

10. Notes with concern the increase in terrorist and criminal attacks in northern Mali against the Malian defense and security forces, the international forces (MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane) and the civilian population, as well as their spread to the central and southern parts of the country. Council strongly condemns these attacks and reiterates its support for the efforts to neutralize the terrorist and criminal groups. Council particularly congratulates MINUSMA on the remarkable work it is doing on the ground, reiterates its full support to the Mission and expresses its appreciation to the Troop and Police Contributing Countries for the huge sacrifices made in the service of peace, security and reconciliation in Mali;

11. Further notes with concern that the increase in the number of attacks in northern Mali has led to further displacements of populations and has contributed to delaying the return of refugees. Council notes the difficult humanitarian situation in northern Mali, including shortage of water, which affects both people and livestock, as well as the high rates of acute and severe malnutrition in this part of the country. Council urgently appeals to the international community as a whole for the mobilization of the necessary financial resources to meet the needs of the affected people, noting in this regard that, as of 5 August 2015, only 33% of the required funds had been mobilized. Council expresses appreciation to the neighboring countries hosting Malian refugees for their generosity;

12. Stresses the importance of strengthening the capacity of the Malian defense and security forces, particularly with regard to equipment and training, to enable them to effectively contribute to the fight against terrorism and transnational organized crime and to take over, in due course, from the international forces. Council commends the work of the EU Training Mission (EUTM) and urges the EU to enhance its support through the program "Train and Equip". Council calls on Member States to contribute actively to the defense and security sector reform provided for in the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali;

13. Welcomes the efforts made by the Commission and the countries of the region, within the framework of the Nouakchott Process on the Enhancement of Security Cooperation and the Operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the Sahelo-Saharan region. In this regard, Council welcomes the Conclusions of the meeting of Chiefs of Defense Staff and Ministers of Defense of the member countries of the Nouakchott Process, held in Bamako, from 2 to 4 September 2015. Council fully supports the efforts to enhance operational border cooperation, particularly through the systematization of joint patrols and the establishment of mixed units involving military contingents. Council takes note with satisfaction of the Algerian proposal on the establishment in Tessalit, northern Mali, of a regional training

and familiarization center for combat in the desert, in support of the member countries of the Nouakchott Process;

14. Takes note of the measures proposed for the possible establishment of an intervention force in northern Mali to combat terrorist and criminal groups, and looks forward to the submission, by the Commission, following the mission to assess the situation and the convening of a meeting of experts to develop a concept of operation, as agreed in Bamako, of a detailed report on the issue, to enable it take the necessary decisions and inform the UN Security Council;

15. Fully supports the measures agreed upon in Bamako to contribute to the strengthening of MINUSMA, including the generation of the equipment required for the African contingents participating in the Mission, the reciprocal secondment of liaison officers, the opening of alternative land supply routes, as well as the exchange of information and intelligence;

16. Reiterates the AU's full support to the efforts of the member countries of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and Benin to completely neutralize the terrorist group Boko Haram, including through the effective operationalization of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Council encourages the Commission to continue to work with the LCBC to this end, as part of the follow-up to communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CDLXXXIX)-Rev. 1, adopted at its 489th meeting held on 3 March 2015. In this regard and in order to enhance the AU's support, Council endorses the recommendation contained in the report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the adjustment of the mandate of the AU Liaison Office in Chad, to include therein coordination with the LCBC as regards the fight against the Boko Haram terrorist group, as well as contribution to the follow-up of the implementation of the Nouakchott Process, in addition to its responsibilities of monitoring the impact of the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan on Chad and the efforts of that country to assist in the resolution of this crisis ;

17. Welcomes the efforts made by the Commission and the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL) towards the implementation of the AU Strategy for the Sahel, as adopted at its 449th meeting held on 11 August 2014 [communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CDXLIX)], including the planned holding, by the end of this year, by MISAHEL and the Algerian Government, of a seminar on development initiatives in the Sahel region. Council encourages MISAHEL to pursue its efforts and to accelerate the implementation process of the Strategy. Council also welcomes the support that MISAHEL, jointly with the Office of the UN Special Envoy for the Sahel Region, extends to the Ministerial Coordination Platform, set up by the countries of the region in November 2013;

18. Stresses the importance of strengthening the MISAHEL and the mobilization of the necessary resources needed for the Mission to discharge its mandate to support the peace and reconciliation process in Mali, coordinate the follow-up of the Nouak-

chott Process and the implementation of the AU Strategy for the Sahel. Council urges the Member States and bilateral and multilateral partners, including the EU, within the framework of the African Peace Facility, to provide the necessary support to this Mission;

19. Requests the Commission to submit regular reports on the implementation of the peace and reconciliation process in Mali, as well as the AU Strategy for the Sahel;

20. Decides to remain actively seized of the situation.

Communiqué du Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l'Union africaine (UA), en sa 544^{ème} réunion sur la situation au Mali et dans la région du Sahel d'une façon plus générale

18 September 2015

Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l'Union africaine (UA), en sa 544^{ème} réunion tenue le 18 septembre 2015, a adopté la décision qui suit sur la situation au Mali et dans la région du Sahel d'une façon plus générale:

Le Conseil,

1. Prend note du rapport de la Présidente de la Commission sur la situation au Mali et les efforts de l'UA en matière de paix et de sécurité dans la région sahélo-saharienne [PSC/PR/2.(DXLIV)]. Le Conseil prend également note des déclarations faites par le Représentant permanent du Mali auprès de l'UA, ainsi que par les représentants de l'Union européenne (UE), du Secrétariat des Nations unies et les membres suivants du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies : Etats-Unis d'Amérique, France et Royaume-Uni;
2. Réitère son attachement au respect de l'unité, de la souveraineté et de l'intégrité territoriale de la République du Mali, conformément aux dispositions pertinentes de l'Acte constitutif de l'UA;
3. Rappelle ses communiqués et communiqués de presse antérieurs sur la situation au Mali et dans la région sahélo-saharienne, y compris le communiqué de presse PSC/BR.(DXIII) adopté lors de sa 513^{ème} réunion tenue le 3 juin 2015;
4. Réitère son plein soutien à l'Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali issu du Processus d'Alger, signé par le Gouvernement de la République du Mali, les Mouvements dits de la Plateforme d'Alger et la Médiation dirigée par l'Algérie, chef de file, et comprenant les pays voisins (Burkina Faso, Mauritanie, Niger, Nigeria et Tchad), des organisations internationales (Nations unies, UA, Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest - CEDEAO, UE et Organisation de la Coopération islamique – OCI), ainsi que la France et les États unis à Bamako, le 15 mai 2015, de même que par la Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA), également à Bamako, le 20 juin 2015. Le Conseil renouvelle son appréciation au Président Ibrahim Boubacar Keita pour son engagement continu en faveur de la paix et de la réconciliation au Mali;
5. Souligne à nouveau que l'Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation constitue un document équilibré qui prend en compte les préoccupations légitimes de toutes les parties, dans le respect de l'unité et de l'intégrité territoriale du Mali, ainsi que du caractère laïc et de la forme républicaine de l'État, et que la mise en œuvre effective de l'Accord permettra de régler durablement les crises qui ont affecté la partie nord du Mali de façon récurrente et d'isoler davantage les éléments terroristes et criminels présents dans cette partie du pays;

6. Se félicite de la mise en place du Comité de suivi de l'Accord (CSA) et des efforts que déploient l'Algérie et les autres membres du CSA pour faciliter le processus de mise en œuvre de l'Accord et le respect scrupuleux par les parties de leurs engagements. Le Conseil note avec satisfaction que le CSA s'est déjà réuni à trois reprises et a mis en place ses sous-comités techniques chargés des questions politiques et institutionnelles, de la défense et de la sécurité, du développement, ainsi que de la justice, de la réconciliation et des questions humanitaires. Le Conseil exhorte le CSA à persévérer dans ses efforts, y compris en adoptant aussi rapidement que possible le chronogramme détaillé de la mise en œuvre de l'Accord;

7. Exprime sa profonde préoccupation face aux difficultés que rencontre le processus de mise en œuvre de l'Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali dans sa phase de lancement, en particulier du fait des incidents intervenus à la mi-août 2015 dans la localité d'Anéfis, dans la région de Kidal, avec les affrontements qui ont opposé les mouvements de la Plateforme à la CMA. Le Conseil condamne fermement ces affrontements, qui constituent une violation flagrante de l'Accord. Le Conseil prend note du retrait des mouvements de la Plateforme de cette localité et prie la Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au Mali (MINUSMA) de veiller à ce que les modalités convenues s'agissant de ce retrait soient scrupuleusement respectées;

8. Exige de toutes les parties concernées qu'elles respectent scrupuleusement les engagements pris, et réitère sa détermination à prendre des sanctions contre tous ceux qui entravent la mise en œuvre de l'Accord et à solliciter à cet égard l'appui du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies et d'autres membres de la communauté internationale;

9. Exhorte la communauté internationale à apporter tout le soutien nécessaire à la mise en œuvre de l'Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali, y compris la mobilisation des ressources financières et de l'appui technique nécessaires pour l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre des programmes de développement envisagés dans le nord du Mali. Le Conseil lance également un appel en vue de la mobilisation des financements nécessaires pour assurer le bon fonctionnement du CSA et de ses sous-comités;

10. Note avec préoccupation la multiplication, dans le nord du Mali, des attaques terroristes et criminelles visant les forces de défense et de sécurité maliennes, les forces internationales (MINUSMA et Opération Barkhane) et la population civile, ainsi que leur extension au centre et au sud du pays. Le Conseil condamne fermement ces attaques, et réitère son soutien aux efforts visant à neutraliser les groupes terroristes et criminels. En particulier, le Conseil félicite la MINUSMA pour le travail remarquable qu'elle accomplit sur le terrain, lui réitère son plein soutien et exprime son appréciation aux pays contributeurs de troupes et de personnels de police pour les sacrifices immenses consentis au service de la paix, de la sécurité et de la réconciliation au Mali;

11. Note également avec préoccupation que la multiplication des attaques dans le nord du Mali a conduit à une augmentation du nombre des personnes déplacées et a contribué à retarder le retour des populations réfugiées. Le Conseil relève la situation humanitaire difficile qui prévaut dans le nord du Mali, y compris la pénurie d'eau qui affecte aussi bien les populations que les troupeaux, ainsi que les taux élevés de malnutrition aigüe et sévère dans cette partie du pays. Le Conseil lance un appel pressant à la communauté internationale dans son ensemble pour la mobilisation des ressources financières nécessaires pour répondre aux besoins des populations affectées, notant à cet égard qu'à la date du 5 août 2015, seuls 33% des fonds requis avaient été mobilisés. Le Conseil exprime son appréciation aux pays voisins accueillant des réfugiés maliens, pour leur générosité;

12. Souligne l'importance que revêt le renforcement des capacités des forces de défense et de sécurité maliennes, notamment en ce qui concerne les équipements et la formation, pour leur permettre de contribuer effectivement à la lutte contre le terrorisme et la criminalité transnationale organisée et de prendre, en temps utile, la relève des forces internationales. Le Conseil salue à cet égard le travail de la Mission de formation de l'UE (EUTM) et exhorte l'UE à renforcer son soutien à travers le programme « Former et Équiper ». Le Conseil appelle les États membres à contribuer activement à la réforme du secteur de la défense et de la sécurité prévue par l'Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali;

13. Se félicite des efforts déployés par la Commission et les pays de la région dans le cadre du Processus de Nouakchott sur le renforcement de la coopération sécuritaire et l'opérationnalisation de l'Architecture africaine de paix et de sécurité dans la région sahélo-saharienne. À cet égard, le Conseil se félicite des conclusions de la réunion des chefs d'Etat-major et des Ministres de la Défense des pays membres du Processus de Nouakchott tenue à Bamako, du 2 au 4 septembre 2015. Le Conseil apporte son plein soutien aux efforts visant à renforcer la coopération opérationnelle aux frontières, notamment à travers la systématisation du recours aux patrouilles conjointes et la mise en place d'unités mixtes impliquant des contingents militaires, et prend note avec satisfaction de la proposition algérienne de création, à Tessalit, dans le nord du Mali, d'un centre régional de formation et d'aguerrissement au combat en zone désertique au profit des États membres du Processus de Nouakchott ;

14. Prend note des mesures envisagées en vue de la création éventuelle d'une force d'intervention pour le nord du Mali en vue de combattre les groupes terroristes et criminels, et attend avec intérêt la soumission par la Commission, après la mission d'évaluation de la situation sur le terrain et la réunion d'experts devant élaborer un concept d'opération convenues lors de la réunion de Bamako, d'un rapport détaillé sur la question, pour lui permettre de prendre les décisions requises et de saisir le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies;

15. Apporte son plein appui aux mesures convenues à Bamako pour aider au renforcement de la MINUSMA, y compris la génération des équipements requis pour les

contingents africains participant à la Mission, le détachement réciproque d'officiers de liaison, l'ouverture de voies d'approvisionnement terrestre alternatives, ainsi que l'échange d'informations et de renseignements;

16. Réitère le plein appui de l'UA aux efforts des pays membres de la Commission du Bassin du Lac Tchad (CBLT) et du Bénin en vue de la neutralisation complète du groupe terroriste Boko Haram, notamment à travers l'opérationnalisation effective de la Force multinationale mixte (FMM). Le Conseil encourage la Commission de continuer à travailler avec la CBLT à cet effet, dans le cadre du suivi du communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CDLXXXIX)-Rev.1 adoptée lors de sa 489ème réunion tenue le 3 mars 2015. À cet égard, et en vue de renforcer l'appui de l'UA, le Conseil fait sienne la recommandation contenue dans le rapport de la Présidente de la Commission sur l'ajustement du mandat du Bureau de Liaison de l'UA au Tchad, pour y inclure la coordination avec la CBLT en ce qui concerne la lutte contre le groupe terroriste Boko Haram, ainsi que la contribution au suivi de la mise en œuvre du Processus de Nouakchott, en plus des responsabilités qui sont les siennes en ce qui concerne le suivi de l'impact de la situation dans la région soudanaise du Darfour sur le Tchad et des efforts de ce pays pour aider au règlement de cette crise;

17. Se félicite des efforts déployés par la Commission et la Mission de l'UA pour le Mali et le Sahel (MISAHEL), en vue de la mise en œuvre de la Stratégie de l'UA pour le Sahel, telle qu'adoptée lors de sa 449ème réunion tenue le 11 août 2014 [communiqué PSC/PR/COMM. (CDXLIX)], y compris l'organisation envisagée avant la fin de cette année, par la MISAHEL et le Gouvernement algérien, d'un séminaire sur les initiatives de développement dans la région du Sahel. Le Conseil encourage la MISAHEL à poursuivre ses efforts et à accélérer le processus de mise en œuvre de la Stratégie. Le Conseil se félicite également de l'appui que la MISAHEL, conjointement avec le Bureau de l'Envoyée spéciale des Nations unies pour la région du Sahel, apporte à la Plateforme ministérielle de coordination mise en place par les pays de la région en novembre 2013;

18. Souligne l'importance que revêt le renforcement de la MISAHEL et la mobilisation à son profit des ressources nécessaires pour la mise en œuvre de son mandat d'appui au processus de paix et de réconciliation au Mali, de coordination du suivi du Processus de Nouakchott et de la mise œuvre de la Stratégie de l'UA pour le Sahel. Le Conseil exhorte les Etats membres et les partenaires bilatéraux et multilatéraux, notamment l'UE dans le cadre de la Facilité pour la paix en Afrique, à apporter le soutien nécessaire à cette Mission;

19. Prie la Commission de lui soumettre des rapports réguliers sur la mise en œuvre du processus de paix et de réconciliation au Mali, ainsi que de la Stratégie de l'UA pour le Sahel;

20. Décide de rester activement saisi de la situation.

Terrorism in Africa

Nations unies : ce qu'ont dit les présidents africains à l'ouverture de la 70e Assemblée générale

Lundi, lors de la première journée du débat général de la 70e Assemblée générale des Nations unies, quelque onze chefs d'État africains se sont exprimés. Jeune Afrique récapitule les déclarations majeures, qui vont des critiques contre le Conseil de sécurité au rejet des droits des homosexuels.



Le Mozambicain Felipe Nyusi, l'Éthiopien Hailemariam Dessalegn, l'Ougandais Yoweri Museveni, le Sud-Africain Jacob Zuma, l'Égyptien Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, le Zimbabwéen Robert Mugabe, le Nigérian Muhammadu Buhari, le Gabonais Ali Bongo Ondimba, le Kényan Uhuru Kenyatta, le Sénégalais Macky Sall et le Malien Ibrahim Bou-bacar Keïta se sont exprimés lundi 28 septembre à la tribune de l'Assemblée générale des Nations unies.

Voici ce qu'il faut retenir de leurs déclarations (disponibles en intégralité en cliquant sur le nom du chef d'État).

Felipe Nyusi et réforme du Conseil de sécurité

Soulignant les défis posés par les conflits et le terrorisme, le président mozambicain a plaidé en faveur d'une réforme des Nations unies et en particulier de son Conseil de sécurité. Il a déclaré qu'il « n'était pas compréhensible que les Nations unies soient un obstacle à la mise en œuvre de leur propre mandat ». S'agissant de la crise des réfugiés et migrants, Felipe Nyusi a estimé qu'elle ne serait pas résolue si l'on continuait de chercher des mesures à court terme, comme la limitation du flux de réfugiés. « Il faut s'attaquer aux causes profondes de la crise », a-t-il exigé.

Hailemariam Dessalegn et les pères fondateurs

« Le monde ne peut se permettre de vivre sans les Nations unies » a déclaré le Premier ministre éthiopien. Toutefois, « les pères fondateurs n'avaient pas prévu la menace du terrorisme et de l'extrémisme violent ni les conséquences dévastatrices des changements climatiques et d'autres défis émergents de notre temps », a-t-il ajouté, plaidant lui aussi pour une réforme du système des Nations unies. Le Premier Ministre a notamment souligné la nécessité d'une représentation accrue de l'Afrique au Conseil de sécurité.

Yoweri Museveni sibyllin

« L'Ouganda a surmonté d'énormes défis au cours des décennies en se basant sur ses capacités locales », a déclaré le président ougandais. Dans une courte analyse de stratégie diplomatique, il a exhorté la communauté internationale à se méfier de « ceux qui cherchent des solutions externes à tous les problèmes ». « Les Nations unies devraient éviter d'être attirées dans des situations par des groupes qui ne jouissent pas de légitimité ou de soutien intérieurs, sinon, l'Organisation ne pourra devenir qu'une partie du problème », a détaillé le chef de l'État.

Jacob Zuma, la Libye et l'ONU

Le Sud-Africain Jacob Zuma a lui aussi regretté que peu d'avancées aient été faites dans la réforme du Conseil de sécurité. « Il est inacceptable et injustifiable qu'un milliard d'Africains soient toujours exclus des membres permanents du Conseil », a déploré le chef de l'État. « Les pays africains ne sont plus des colonies mais des pays libres, indépendants et souverains. L'ONU ne peut prétendre que le monde n'a pas changé depuis 1945 », a ajouté Jacob Zuma. Le président a également évoqué la situation en Libye, conséquence directe des erreurs de membres du Conseil de sécurité selon lui, ayant « abusé » du concept de « responsabilité à protéger ». Jacob Zuma a encore estimé que la crise actuelle des réfugiés était en partie née de ces erreurs en Libye ou encore en Syrie.

Abdel Fattah al-Sissi et le terrorisme

« Il n'existe aucun doute qu'un milliard et demi de musulmans ont refusé de souscrire aux vues d'une minorité terroriste qui entend parler en leur nom », a rappelé le président égyptien. « Pourtant, beaucoup au sein de la communauté internationale ont refusé de reconnaître que nous nous battons contre le même ennemi », a-t-il ajouté. « Les grandes puissances doivent aujourd'hui se concentrer sur la reconstruction de l'État libyen afin de combattre les terroristes avant qu'ils puissent s'étendre plus profondément en Afrique », a appelé le chef de l'État qui a assuré que l'Égypte aspirait à jouer un rôle dans la paix et la sécurité internationales, en tant que membre non-permanent du Conseil de sécurité dans les deux prochaines années.

Le président zimbabwéen a estimé qu'une réforme du Conseil de sécurité était nécessaire, afin « de donner une juste place aux propositions africaines ». Robert Mugabe a également insisté sur son rejet de toute tentative d'imposer de « nouveaux droits », tels que ceux des homosexuels, à des pays dont la culture y serait contraire. Enfin, et avant de dénoncer les mesures prises contre son pays par l'Union européenne et les États-Unis, il a exhorté l'ONU à faire aboutir la « décolonisation » du Sahara occidental et à cesser de nier les droits du peuple saharaoui.

Muhammadu Buhari et les filles de Chibok

Pour son premier discours à l'ONU, le président nigérian a promis de mieux lutter contre la corruption et autres « pratiques criminelles ». Évoquant la menace terroriste de Boko Haram, il a rappelé que la libération des jeunes filles enlevées à Chibok en avril 2014 restait une priorité de son gouvernement. « Nous avons chassé Boko Haram de plusieurs de ses bastions, avons tué et capturé plusieurs de ses chefs et libéré des centaines d'otages », a-t-il rappelé, en faisant référence à la coalition composée du Cameroun, du Nigeria, du Tchad, du Niger et du Bénin. « Le monde fait face au défi du trafic d'êtres humains, qui prend aujourd'hui une dimension inédite ».

Ali Bongo Ondimba et la Centrafrique

Le chef de l'État gabonais a exhorté l'ONU à jouer un rôle plus important dans la résolution des conflits à travers le monde. Il a notamment évoqué la crise centrafricaine, dans laquelle « la communauté internationale doit redoubler d'efforts ». Insistant sur la nécessité de renforcer la lutte contre le terrorisme, notamment au niveau financier, Ali Bongo Ondimba a plaidé pour une réforme du Conseil de sécurité. « Le Gabon soutient la proposition française d'étendre le droit de veto au-delà des membres non-permanents », a-t-il expliqué. Enfin, le chef de l'État gabonais a insisté sur la nécessité de trouver un accord global sur le changement climatique, à deux mois de l'ouverture de la COP21, à Paris.

Uhuru Kenyatta et la corne de l'Afrique

Le chef de l'État kényan a particulièrement insisté sur les menaces persistantes en Somalie, dans la corne de l'Afrique, au Sahel et au Soudan du Sud. Évoquant des « menaces pour le Kenya mais aussi sur le monde entier », il a exhorté le Conseil de sécurité à assumer son rôle dans « la résolution des conflits ». Le président a également assuré que son pays continuerait de lutter contre les terroristes Shebab dans la sous-région, tout en insistant sur le rôle prépondérant des organismes régionaux, notamment de la Communauté des États d'Afrique de l'Est.

Macky Sall et la gouvernance

« Le monde peine encore à se débarrasser des masques hideux du racisme, de la discrimination raciale, de la xénophobie et de l'extrémisme violent », a déploré le président sénégalais, appelant à plus de solidarité envers les réfugiés. « Les travailleurs migrants sont discriminés alors qu'ils contribuent à la sueur de leur front à la prospérité de leur pays d'accueil », a-t-il ajouté. Le président en exercice de la Cedeao a encore plaidé pour « un ordre international renouvelé » et le « respect des droits de l'Afrique », dans la droite ligne des discours de bon nombre de ses homologues du continent. « Solidaire du Nigeria et des autres pays dans la lutte contre Boko Haram », le président sénégalais a rappelé les progrès enregistrés dans la gouvernance régionale en Afrique de l'Ouest.


Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, l'engagé

« Je voudrais solennellement réitérer l'engagement du gouvernement du Mali de respecter tous ses engagements découlant des accords d'Alger », a déclaré le président malien, qui a toutefois lancé un « appel pressant » à la communauté internationale, « en vue de la mobilisation effective des ressources techniques, matérielles et financières nécessaires » à leur application. Saluant le renouvellement du mandat de la Minusma, Ibrahim Boubacar a encore salué le rôle de la France et des États-Unis dans le processus de paix, tout en affirmant l'implication du Mali dans la dynamique de développement durable alors que le pays « subit de plein fouet les effets du changement climatique à cause de la fragilité de son écosystème ».

<http://www.dakaractu.com/>

Understanding international terrorism

September 23, 2015



The Acting Head of Department, Jurisprudence and Public Law Department of Babcock University, Dr Yinka Olomajobi, has added his voice to the global menace threatening many nations of the world – terrorism.

He is out with a new book, entitled: *Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Africa*, to be presented in Lagos on Tuesday, September 29.

The book's preoccupation is worthy of note as it focuses on the most contemporaneous central issue since the Cold War era—the clash of the West and Islamic civilisation. The 366-page book is timely and a record of well researched facts and a cautionary exposition for the imperative necessity for bridging the gaps between Africa's have's and have's not.

Even though a substantial intellectual study has grown on issues surrounding the radical Islam since the atrocities of 9/11, Dr Olomajobi's book provides an enthusiastic and much needed exposition that explores the phenomenon of radical Islam in Africa. The book, which is his third, gives a distinct and comprehensive angle to existing arguments on terrorism.

Dr Olomajobi, who holds a LL.M in International Law, (University of Liverpool, Eng-

land) and a PhD (Lancaster University, England), he has also written two books: *Islam & Conflict in Northern Nigeria* and *Human Rights on Gender, Sex and the Law*.

While his first book focuses on the conflicts in a part of Nigeria, his third explores a global perspective to conflicts brewed by radicalism.

In the *Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Africa*, the author reveals quite assuredly the clash of civilisations between Islam and the West. Each chapter focuses on issues about the factors that promote radical Islam in Africa. From Chapter One, the book exposes a careful build-up of arguments and analysis.

In this chapter the author carefully details and theorises how to probe into the study of radical Islam. Aside from using theories based on political science, he adopts a philosophical approach to his work in order to understand the relationship between Islamists and their notions of jihad.

In Chapter Two, he argues that theoretical explanations of how religion takes the centre stage in society and in international relations, while demonstrating, convincingly, the new role of religion in a globalised world.

Chapter Three offers divergent expositions on Islam and jihad. It highlights the ways in which jihad is understood and interpreted. Dr Olomojobi argues that the essence of jihad “is the desire to fight perceived oppression”.

Chapter Four affords the reader with in-depth analysis on terrorism and highlights the complexities of defining the term. However, the author fittingly describes terrorism as an act that “generates a psychological notion of fear amongst the citizens of a state. It creates a situation of anxiety therefore using propaganda to channel its grievance to the public, in order to be heard and taken seriously”.

The keenness and forcefulness of the writer’s thoughts and eloquent prose are illustrated in his expositions of radical Islamist groups in Africa. He, then, takes the reader through the vicious activities of Boko Haram in Chapter Five.

From Chapter Six to Chapter Nine, the author explores major jihadi groups and their ideologies in Africa. Dr Olomojobi culminates his expository voyage with the nefarious activities of Al Qaeda in the Maghreb in Chapter 10.

In profiling radical groups, the author does not occupy the reader with contrived arguments, but he highlights facts that have not been compressed worthy of note in understanding the diverse ideologies surrounding terrorism across the world. The author ends with a chapter which reveals the propagation of terrorism through the Internet.

As one reads through the book, one could see that Dr Olomojobi is a perceptive thinker and a profound political analyst, who delivers his arguments with facts, illustrating useful insights from other renowned scholars, whilst provoking intellectual rigour and the ability to provoke and capture critical thoughts of the reader. Be-

cause of its juicy fresh addition to the study of international terrorism, the book is a must read to political leaders, leaders of thoughts, diplomats and the public at large.

<http://thenationonlineng.net/>

The Refugee Crisis: Separating the Conspiracies from The Conspiracy™

SEPTEMBER 25, 2015



As the refugee crisis in Europe has come to dominate western media headlines, it has predictably given rise to a complex web of theories, analyses, and politically and ideologically charged omissions and distortions. The corporate propagandists of 'acceptable journalism' have presented the issue in a purely humanitarian and cultural light, with little to no political context in terms of the refugee influx as the fruit of imperial wars in Africa and Asia.

These bastions of journalistic truth have managed to flush down the memory hole nearly all evidence published in their own pages of the overlapping strategies of regional and international powers that have conspired to wage war in Syria, openly colluded in wars of aggression in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen, and prolonged and capitalized from seemingly endless conflicts in Somalia and elsewhere. All of these very conscious decisions by the ruling class and its political establishment in the US-NATO (plus Israel and GCC), have led directly to the "crisis" as it exists today. And yet, if they're mentioned at all, it is merely in passing bemusement, the way one might refer to a stupid comment made after one too many tequila shots at a margarita happy hour.

The refugee issue then becomes less a product of political conflict, and more a cultural battlefield with trenches dug along racial and ethnic lines: the struggle to maintain European 'civilization' against the barbaric hordes of uncivilized brown-skinned invaders arriving as a "swarm," to borrow the unintentionally honest expression used by British Prime Minister David Cameron to describe the refugees. This is of course the neocolonial, supremacist position espoused most vocally by the far right throughout Europe, from Marine Le Pen and the Front National in France, to Hunga-

ry's conservative Prime Minister Viktor Orban whose heavy-handed tactics – building fences, mobilizing troops and the unemployed, convicts, and fascists of various stripes – to block the refugee influx, have been both praised and condemned by various elements in Europe.

While there is clearly an attempt to rewrite recent history to scrub the role of imperialism in fostering this crisis, there is also a deafening silence on the role of certain regional and international actors in manipulating it for political advantage. For instance, there is virtually no discussion in mainstream (and much of the alternative) media regarding the role of Turkey in redirecting refugees from its country to Greece and into Europe. There has yet to be even one substantive investigative piece in any establishment media on the collusion between the human traffickers of the Islamic State and other terror groups and criminal gangs, and their backers in the US, Europe, and Middle East. Equally, there has been virtually zero discussion of how the strategy of manipulated migration is part of a broader effort to further the goals of the Empire in the Global South.

Indeed, such questions and debates are critical to understanding the political, economic, and socio-cultural implications of this issue. However, in asking such questions, one almost immediately encounters the virulent strains of racism, bigotry, and outright fascism whose pernicious influence has become pervasive in nominally anti-imperialist circles. Sometimes such ideology is manifested in centuries-old reactionary conspiracy theories in which cabals of Jews, Jesuits, freemasons, or reptilian overlords (as the case may be) conspire to destroy white Christendom. Other times it is simply a rehashing of the 'barbarian invader' trope, a product of both European history and good old fashioned Euro-supremacism.

Why are these questions critical? Simply put, the discourse on the refugee crisis is essential to undermining the entire imperialist agenda in Africa and the Middle East. Leftists must be cautious not to take the bait on the liberal versus conservative culture war narrative rooted in a neocolonial worldview, while at the same time remaining vigilant about both the real geopolitical machinations driving the crisis, and the fascistic memes that pass for "telling the truth" in the quagmire of social media and online activism.

A Conspiracy of Silence

There are two distinct ways in which the corporate media, in its role as propaganda appendage of the Empire, has deliberately confused the refugee issue. On the one hand, they have shielded the narrative from penetration by uncomfortable questions regarding the role of the West and its proxies in initiating, fomenting, and expanding the wars in Syria, Libya, Yemen, Afghanistan, and beyond. By doing so, the media removes the refugees from their politico-historical context, transforming them into so-called "migrants" – an elusive term designed to obscure the reality of who these people are, and why they're desperately trying to get into Europe – as if they're simply poor people looking for work, rather than victims of im-

perialism looking to protect their families and escape wars and destabilizations initiated by the West.

On the other hand, the media has simply refused to critically examine exactly the relationship between the flow of refugees and the policies, both overt and covert, of the countries participating either directly or indirectly in these wars. There is virtually no investigation into the facilitation of refugee travel by the Turkish government despite the literally countless reports of the Islamic State, al-Qaeda groups, and myriad criminal organizations engaging in human trafficking in Syria and Libya specifically.

With respect to Syria, Turkish intelligence is directly implicated in collusion with jihadis of the Nusra and ISIS variety, smuggling both fighters and weapons into Syria in the ongoing attempt to implement regime change against the Syrian government. According to Cumhuriyet, a popular Turkish daily:

a group of jihadis were first brought to the Turkish border town of Reyhanli on January 9, 2014 from Atme refugee camp in Syria in a clandestine operation. From there, they were smuggled into Tal Abyad, a border town used by ISIS as a gateway from Turkey, on two buses rented by the MIT [Turkish intelligence]... which it said were stopped by police a day after the operation following a tip-off that they were smuggling drugs into Syria. It was revealed that the buses had been used to smuggle jihadis after investigators found bullets, weapons and ammunition abandoned in the buses. The drivers of the buses, who were briefly arrested, said in their testimony they were told that they were carrying Syrian refugees and the vehicles were rented by the MIT.

Two important points should be immediately apparent in reading the reports. First, and perhaps most obvious, is the direct relationship and contact between Turkish intelligence and terrorist fighters intent on waging war in Syria. Secondly, and most important to this examination, is the fact that, as the bus drivers' testimony clearly indicates, they were told by Turkish authorities that they were carrying Syrian refugees. It seems then that Turkish intelligence openly facilitates the transit of refugees throughout Turkey, and has a direct chain of custody over their movements. Taken in tandem with the knowledge that Turkish intelligence is also working with ISIS and Nusra then, it is not at all far-fetched to assume that they are also colluding in the human trafficking networks.

This is an important point because it is these smuggling organizations which are directly implicated in funding ISIS in places like Libya. According to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, the value of refugee smuggling in Libya alone reached \$323 million in 2014, "dwarf[ing] any existing trafficking and smuggling businesses in the region... [it]has particularly strengthened groups with a terrorist agenda, including the Islamic State."

But while media has noted this important phenomenon, they have almost entirely

buried the fact that those same ISIS (Islamic State) networks in Libya are being run by US-NATO asset Abdelhakim Belhadj, the man touted as a hero and great revolutionary by the imperialists in their war on Libya in 2011. Indeed, Belhadj served the US cause in Libya so well that he can be seen receiving accolades from Sen. John McCain, never one to shy away from a photo op with a terrorist or fascist. Belhadj was initially rewarded after the fall of Gaddafi with the post of military commander of Tripoli, though he was forced to give way to a more politically palatable “transitional government” which has since evaporated leaving in its wake ISIS, run by the very same Belhadj.

It must be said that the refugee issue is far bigger than just US-NATO wars in Libya and Syria. Indeed, the refugees have come from countries that have been directly impacted by other imperialist policies, such as the ongoing economic war against Eritrea. As WikiLeaks cables revealed, there has been a concerted effort by the US to promote and facilitate the migration of Eritrean youth to the West using the lure of “educational opportunities” funded by the US government. Many of these young Eritreans, duped as they are, are then sadly caught up in the same human trafficking networks, often becoming victims of kidnapping or worse.

Similarly, many of the refugees come from Afghanistan and Iraq, two countries still being devastated by US wars of aggression. They come from Pakistan where terror groups have waged genocidal campaigns against Shia muslims of the Hazara ethnic group, among others. They come from Somalia, a country still embroiled in a seemingly endless state of chaos facilitated by US policy. In short, the refugees are unmistakably victims of US-NATO (plus Israel and GCC) imperial policies. And there is almost no mention of any of this.

What does get traction in the corporate media however is the potential need for still more war, this time to “help the refugees.” In short, the political and military establishment in the US makes the insidious, and deeply cynical, argument that the only way to help the people of Syria is to bomb them and destroy their country further, just as it argued in Libya in 2011. And again, there is almost no critical debate in the major media. Essentially, the corporate press acts as the de facto public relations wing of the ruling class, setting the parameters of how the refugee issue is to be discussed. As Noam Chomsky famously said, the media acts to “strictly limit the spectrum of acceptable opinion, but allow very lively debate within that spectrum.”

Racism, Refugees, and the Rothschild-Jew-NWO-Illuminati-Muslim-Freemason-Reptilian Conspiracy™

As soon as one begins to interrogate the issues by asking questions such as those above, immediately one is confronted by the most exasperatingly tiresome, hackneyed, and utterly discredited conspiracy theories which still worm their way into far too much online discourse. In fact, according to such internet buffoonery, nearly every political development and conflict in the world can be chalked up to some

illusory master plan enacted generations ago by a secret cabal of [insert demonized group of choice], rather than the complex political, economic, and social factors that give rise to human phenomena; so, too, with the refugee issue.

The conversation often can sound something like, *"Have you noticed that the Muslims and Africans flooding into Europe are mostly young males? It's not a coincidence that the Jewish globalist plan is to destroy national boundaries and pervert the white Christian world with a fifth column in the quest for total global control through the destruction of nations and consolidation of the rule of Jewish bankers. #WhiteGenocide."* One could be forgiven for thinking that that is satire and hyperbole for comedic effect; sadly, no. That is taken almost verbatim from multiple memes and various written pieces circulating in the morass of social media.

Normally, one would be quick to dismiss such idiocy as simply the childish ramblings of fascist nitwits whose study of history is confined to the Alex Jones School for Racist Lunacy. However, it is important to note that such discourse has an increasingly strong presence in nominally anti-imperialist and leftist circles, where opposition to Israel's genocidal policies, and the supremacist ideology of Zionism, provide cover for outright fascist tendencies to cloak themselves in the flag of anti-Zionism. When the unhinged blather of David Icke and Alex Jones becomes acceptable discourse, it is cause for any anti-imperialist to worry. For this reason, the refugee issue has caused many of us to worry.

The late author and journalist Alex Cockburn, a co-editor of CounterPunch for many years, in examining the allure of conspiracism generally (9-11 trutherism specifically), brilliantly wrote in 2011:

[Conspiracism has] penetrated deep into the American left...These days a dwindling number of leftists learn their political economy from Marx. Into the theoretical and strategic void has crept a diffuse, peripatetic conspiracist view of the world that tends to locate ruling class devilry not in the crises of capital accumulation, or the falling rate of profit, or inter-imperial competition, but in locale (the Bohemian Grove, Bilderberg, Ditchley, Davos) or supposedly "rogue" agencies, with the CIA still at the head of the list.

Though speaking of 9-11, Cockburn could easily have broadened that critique to include the growing number of people on both left and right, who subscribe to the Rothschild-Illuminati-New World Order worldview (if it can be called that). His argument, entirely correct in my view, is that in place of real historical-materialist analysis, or substantive analysis of any kind, be it anti-capitalist or the like, a sort of quasi-mystical belief in irrational and unseen forces has taken root in the collective imagination of many so-called activists.

Cockburn quoted philosopher and CounterPunch contributor Michael Neumann who succinctly noted that such thinking "probably comes from the decline of Western power. Deep down, almost everyone, across the political spectrum, is locked in a bigotry which can only attribute that decline to some irrational or su-

pernatural power. The result is the ascendancy of magic over common sense, let alone reason.” Indeed, it is bigotry, or perhaps more correctly a reactionary racist and fascistic worldview, that owes much to tsarist and Nazi propaganda, and the right wing extremist scribes who preserved it in the post-war period.

Such thinking is, sadly, not only alive, but thriving, in allegedly anti-imperialist circles. No doubt these memes have been wet-nursed by Zionism and Israeli policies which, in point of fact, are fascist and in many ways indistinguishable from the Nazism they allegedly abhor, as this author has argued numerous times. In effect, Zionism has contributed in no small part to the proliferation and normalization of fascist sentiment on both left and right.

And it is precisely this sort of thinking that is now coloring the debate on refugees. Suddenly, the refugee crisis becomes a conspiracy to destroy ‘White Europe,’ rather than an outgrowth of imperialist wars undertaken by the US-NATO powers. Suddenly, the refugees become invaders, while the aggressors become the victims. This inversion is at once insidious and incredibly disheartening for those activists and analysts (this author included) who dedicate much of their time and effort to exposing the machinations of the Empire and its hegemonic agenda.

To again quote Cockburn, *“There are plenty of real conspiracies...Why make up fake ones?”* Exactly! The conspiracy of regional and international actors needs to be unraveled, the evidence made public, the guilty prosecuted for war crimes. The conspiracy of silence in the corporate media needs to be exposed for what it is: still more evidence of how the propaganda matrix actually operates, how it serves the Empire. These are the conspiracies that matter. Let’s leave the Rothschilds, Illuminati, and lizard people to the darker recesses of internet irrelevance.

While the racists cry from the mountaintops that their precious White Europe is under siege, let us recognize that the discourse of anti-imperialism is also under siege; that the anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, anti-fascist space must be reclaimed and must be defended, whatever the cost.

<http://www.counterpunch.org/>

Compliance vrs organised crime and terror, my perspectives – Tunde Ogunsakin

September 17, 2015

The act of terrorism and other related crimes have been captioned under organized crimes simply because of the way they carry out their activities sometimes without been arrested. At other times, it is organized simply because of the manner in which it is carried out without much trace.

Terrorism was strange in Nigeria and Africa but recently it has become a common phenomenon. Africa was known for inter and intra states conflict, ethnicity, religious and other minor conflicts such as boundary issues.



AIG Tunde Ogunsakin

However, today, it has taken a new dimension. In Nigeria for instance, the act of terrorism has become rampant and has taken a major toll in Nigeria. The kind of communal living in Nigeria frowned against terrorism but suddenly terrorism has become a recurrent decimal.

Nigeria has suffered from the operations of organized crime from oil bunkering to money laundering and terrorism. This cannot be totally divulged from the impact of globalization that has taken centre stage in interstate relationship globally.

Nigeria is the most populous, ethno-linguistically configured and religiously diverse nation in Africa. It is the world's eighth largest oil exporter, the fifth largest crude oil supplier to the United States, and the country with the seventh-largest gas reserves in the world. It is a dominant sub-regional power in Africa, a major player in international oil market and a strategic country within the geopolitical calculation of the world order.

What happens in the country, particularly, in the area of internal security as being manifested in the deadly terrorist campaigns in the northern part of the country is, therefore, of significant consequences to regional stability, international security, and global economic order.

It is for this reason that this international workshop is not only strategic but timely given the current threat of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. There are currently two dominant terrorist cells which share the same fundamentalist ideology and violent operational strategy in Nigeria.

These include the 'Jama'atu Allus Sunnah Lilda Wati Wal Jihad' also known as 'Boko Haram' (Western Education is a taboo) in local parlance, and 'Ansarul Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan' (Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa). Beyond

these two well-structured cells, there are other less-organised splinter groups which are known to hide under the cover of terrorism to engage in non-terrorist related crimes.

The Boko Haram sect represents the vision and mission of a fundamentalist Islamic movement in Nigeria. Boko Haram has terrorized Nigeria in the last five years with their spate of killings and bombing especially in the northern part of Nigeria. This made them to extend to neighbouring countries such as Chad, Cameroun and Niger to carry out their nefarious activities. This has informed the newly established Joint Task Force among the neighboring countries to handle the spread and influx of people within their borders.

Cross-border and immigration crime is often highly organised and generates large profits for the criminals involved. It causes untold harm to individuals and communities and costs the tax payer billions of pounds each year in enforcement costs and lost tax revenue.

Conceptual definitions

Organized crime has been defined variously by different scholars. However many of them are cautious about the definition considering the delicate nature of the changing character of association of individuals involved in criminal enterprises.

Some argue that the term is not very useful for analysing diverse activities and enterprises associated with illegal means to supply legitimate goods and services or employ illegal means to supply illicit goods.

In the old fashioned criminological analysis, organised crime as a concept was derived from the structure of mafia organisations with hierarchical structure with layers of position and corresponding tasks and powers. By definition, transnational organized crime entails criminal activity that is coordinated across national borders.

According to Abadinsky, organized crime is: Organised crime is a non-ideological enterprise involving a number of persons in close social interaction, organised on a hierarchical basis, with at least three levels/ranks, for the purpose of securing profit and power by engaging in illegal and legal activities.

Positions in the hierarchy and positions involving functional specialization may be assigned on the basis of kinship or friendship, or rationally assigned according to skill. The positions are not dependent on the individuals occupying them at any particular time. Permanency is assumed by the members who strive to keep the enterprise integral and active in pursuit of its goals. It eschews competition and strives for monopoly on an industry or territorial basis.

There is a willingness to use violence and/or bribery to achieve ends or to maintain discipline. Membership is restricted, although non-members may be involved on a contingency basis. There are explicit rules, oral or written, which are enforced by

sanctions that include murder.

From this definition of Abadinsky, organized crime has a group of people or criminals they recruit into the gang depending on the nature of their group.

Forms of organised crimes

Several forms of transnational criminal activity by organisations and individuals in West Africa have been reported in the literature. The major forms include:

- * Corruption and money laundering in West African countries, and in Europe and the United States of America.

Human trafficking across West African countries, and from West Africa to the Middle East and Europe.

- * Drug trafficking: West African countries are used as transit routes for cocaine and heroin. However, cannabis is produced in some West African countries and traded within and beyond the region.

- * Arms trafficking into and within the West African region.

- * Advance fee fraud with propositions emanating from some West Africa to Europe and North America.

- * Internet fraud including identity theft.

- * Smuggling of used cars. For example, used cars are imported from Europe into the Republic of Benin and smuggled into Nigeria.

- * Smuggling of prohibited or controlled goods such as pharmaceutical psychotropic drugs, chemicals, etc.

- * Piracy, especially in the Gulf of Guinea.

- * Armed robbery, especially automobile-hijacking. Gangs of robbers, for example, snatch expensive cars from their owners in Nigeria which are then taken to neighbouring countries such as Benin, Togo and Chad.

- * Smuggling of goods out of West Africa: diamonds from Sierra Leone through Liberia and Guinea; oil and precious stones from Nigeria; gold from Ghana; Vices (gambling, prostitution, etc.).

- * Fraudulent trade practices, including dumping of sub-standard products and misrepresentation; illicit foreign exchange transactions (including money laundering) and siphoning of assets from Africa to developing economies (for instance over-invoicing, under-invoicing, abuse of investment concessions, tax and duty evasions, etc.).

* Dumping of toxic materials.

On the one hand, the term can be used to refer to certain types of more sophisticated criminal activities embedded, in one form or another, in complex illicit markets. Arms, drug, and human trafficking are often correlated with a set of 'enabling activities' such as (the threat of) violence, corruption, and money laundering.

One group of authors assumes that the former constitute core activities of organized crime; another refers to the latter. In both cases the offences can usually be categorized as 'serious crimes'. It may be more accurate to use the term 'organized criminality'.

However, some of these aforementioned are not particularly a problem in Nigeria but terrorism, money laundering, human trafficking, drug abuse, car theft, oil bunkering, militancy and sea piracy are among the most threatening menaces in Nigeria and the surrounding states. There is a close link between terrorism and organised crime in several ways.

The effect and impact of organised crimes in Nigeria is enormous. It affects the development of the country and discourages investment. Particularly in area of insecurity, organised crime has eroded the people's conscience.

Organised crimes has affected the free flow of divided of democracy in Nigeria particularly corruption, money laundering, human trafficking, oil theft terrorism/ insurgency in Nigeria.

The consequences of organized crime for a democracy, particularly in developing and weak states, are most damaging where criminal organizations have penetrated the political domain in order to better consolidate or expand their economic opportunities and in order to limit competition.

The impact is one that follows a path of a gradual expansion of power and influence: Democracy around the globe is facing formidable challenges today, not from martial forces from outside, as we saw heretofore, but from subversive militants from within.

Democracy is infected by a pernicious affliction initiated and propagated by organized crime that gains control progressively, maybe first as only a communal criminal gang, to later transform itself into a market driven force, eventually infiltrating the legitimate government at all levels, and finally rendering the government powerless. Throughout the metamorphosis organized crime enlarges its power structure and fortifies itself as democracy atrophies or is lost altogether.

Organised crime has constituted an obstacle to democracy in Nigeria and Africa at large. Many of the stolen money were laundered abroad leaving the country at the mercy of poverty and unemployment. It is, however, heartwarming to know that the new administration of President Buhari Muhammadu, GCFR, has given hope to Nigeria in this regard. This is so as the Nigerian President has repeatedly emphasized his

resolve to recover all Nigeria money that were stolen and taken abroad.

Compliance

Legal framework against organised crime in Nigeria

Terrorism constitutes a total infringement and intentional deprivation of the citizens "right to life as enshrined in Section 33 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). Other international human rights instruments also guarantees right to life which is a fundamental human right. Apart from the fact that terrorism is generally viewed as inhumane; it is equally a criminal act which the whole world frowns at.

International Conventions

On the 28th of September, 2001, Resolution 13736 was adopted by the Security Council. The said Resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which obligates States to implement more effective counter-terrorism measures at the national level and to increase international cooperation in the struggle against terrorism. The Resolution created the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to monitor action on this issue and to receive reports from States on measures taken.

Apart from this, eighteen universal instruments (fourteen instruments and four amendments) against international terrorism have been elaborated within the framework of the United Nations system relating to specific terrorist activities.

Member States through the General Assembly have been increasingly coordinating their counter-terrorism efforts and continued their legal norm-setting work. At the same time a number of programmes, offices and agencies of the United Nations system have been engaged in specific activities against terrorism; further assisting Member States in their counter-terrorism efforts.

To consolidate and enhance these activities, Member States in September, 2006 embarked upon a new phase in their counter-terrorism efforts by agreeing on a global strategy to counter terrorism.

The Strategy marks the first time that all Member States of the UN have agreed to a common strategic and operational framework to fight terrorism. Further still, there are also myriad of treaties which address different forms of terrorist practices.

Some of which are the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970), the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971), the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973), the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979), the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980), the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety

of Civil Aviation (1988), the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988), the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf (1988) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997).

The above notwithstanding, the level of sabotage carried out by terrorists continues to increase on a daily basis in Africa and world over. How much havoc terrorism has done to our society economically, socially and politically remains incalculable.

Again on 21st February 2012, the Security Council met to consider matters related to peace and security in Africa, focusing on the impact of transnational organised crime on peace, security and stability in West Africa and the Sahel region.

After the meeting it issued a statement (S/PRST/2012/2) in which it: expressed concern about the serious threats to international peace and stability in different regions of the world, in particular in West Africa and the Sahel Region, posed by transnational organised crime, including illicit weapons and drug trafficking, piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as terrorism and its increasing links, in some cases, with transnational organized crime and drug trafficking.

The Council stresses that these growing international threats, particularly in West Africa and the Sahel Region, contribute to undermining governance, social and economic development and stability, and creating difficulties for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, while threatening to reverse peace-building advances in the region

Government Responses against Terrorism and Organised Crime In Nigeria

Policy measures

Policy is the foundation with which actions are founded. Policy measures proceed from the executive, in contrast to legislative measures which are primarily acts of parliament. The policy response to counter insurgency in Nigeria relies on military actions and government's synergy with neighbouring countries to step up action against organized crime and insurgency.

The Nigeria government in its foreign relations is seeking the support and assistance of the United States of America and United Nations in its fight against terrorism and organized crime.

A robust counter terrorism strategy would consider the perceived threat against the country's historical, political and socio-economic context, assess needs and identify gaps, consider options and prescribe approach which would form objective criteria for engagement.

In addition to being a confidence-building tool for stakeholders and the various defence and security actors, a clear strategy would also form a guide for military budgeting and procurement in line with identified needs, a tool for tracking military ex-

penditure thereby promoting transparency and accountability, and a yardstick for measuring success and review where necessary (Adetula, 2015). This observation can be factored into our counterinsurgency strategies in order to block every perceived loophole in the strategy. However, the prospect is quite high with the current effort and initiatives.

Socio-economic Measure

This measure is very key to ameliorating the sufferings and poverty in the Land. Part of the cause of insurgency has to do with high level of poverty, lack of adequate infrastructure, unemployment and dwindling level of education.

Socio-economic measures are better assessed in the medium to long term since their impact might not be immediately felt. Such measures seek to address and eliminate conditions conducive to terrorism. It includes promoting policies aimed at addressing the root causes of terrorism, including poverty and unemployment, economic and political marginalisation, human rights abuses, corruption, and weak security institutions. Specific policies should also be developed to counter terrorist propaganda, dissuade and deter people from turning to terrorism.

The government of Nigeria is presently embarking on measures like infrastructural development of border areas and engagement with border communities to help in combating transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking, establishment of and support to Almajiri schools in northeastern Nigeria, Safe Schools Initiative, provision of irrigation and agricultural development to provide alternative livelihoods for the unemployed, sensitization to prevent radicalization of youth, and so on. These measures will only need to be strengthened so as to have an impact on the people and other tangible infrastructural development and food security.

Legislative Measures

These are measures that have to pass through the National Assembly of Nigeria to become laws and Nigeria in recent times have passed such laws to curb the activities of insurgents and other forms of terrorism in Nigeria. These laws are the foundation with which the offenders can be punished after being apprehended.

Enabling laws are important especially in relation to new and emerging threats because in a constitutional democracy, laws provide the foundation for action or legitimacy for response. In addition to existing laws, several relevant Acts have been passed in the past five years or so and may be found on the Nigerian National Assembly website.

These would include Anti-Terrorism Act, Anti-Piracy Act, Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing (Prohibition) Act, etc. The legal texts are there but empirical evidence is rare on what impact the laws have had in the fight against transnational organised crime and jihadist activities, and on if the provisions of the laws are sufficient or if there are gaps that need to be filled.

Law enforcement measures

Law enforcement measures include efforts to improve the Nigeria Police Force, Customs and Immigration Services in relation to transnational organized crime, installation of detection equipment at airports and seaports, internal security and policing.

Such efforts would include extensive training of officers to confront new threats such as terrorism, improved intelligence gathering and analysis as well as their effects on prevention if any, improvement of community policing through community partnership in policing. Importantly, efforts at prevention should seek to deny terrorists access to funds, communication, materials and space with which to plan and launch their attacks.

Military measures

Military measures seem to be the most potent Nigeria has depended on for a while. This is so as diplomacy and negotiation have not yielded any positive results.

This measure include deployment of the Joint Task Force and Special Forces to north-east Nigeria, advanced weapons procurement, training of military personnel in counterterrorism operations, and recently, rescue of over 700 persons, mostly women and girls, from Sambisa Forest. Budgetary implications of the military measures have been significant.

For instance, defence and security took almost 25 percent of Nigeria's 2014 budget; in addition a supplementary budget of \$1 billion was approved to support the fight against Boko Haram in the northeast. However, this measure is yielding positive outcome in northeast especially with the assumption of President Muhammadu Buhari, GCFR, as the Head of State. Nigeria is gaining and seeing the rewards of the monies expended on military and weapons. It is expected that with the tempo of military measures by the Nigeria Military, the Presidential directive to the Nigerian Military to bring insurgency to an end within three months will be a reality.

International convention against money laundering

All of these money laundering activities occur in the pan-Atlantic. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an intergovernmental body of 36 member countries and the international lead on such crimes. FATF's purpose is to develop and promote policies at national and international levels and to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

FATF estimates that criminal proceeds amounted to 3.6% of global gross domestic product (GDP), with 2.7% (\$1.6 trillion) laundered through a variety of methods, including precious metals, phony off shores and fronts, and new e-gambling and non-bank typologies.

The FATF's June 2013 "blacklist" of Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories included Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as would be expected.

However, several African countries now appear on the Not Sufficiently Compliant Countries and Territories list, including Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Tanzania.

In South America, Argentina and Bolivia keep moving on and off the list of non-cooperative countries, and as of this writing have moved to “improving and monitoring” status.

With the arrival of tons of drugs from powerful Latin DTOs, and their governments rife with corruption, money laundering is surely proliferating in West Africa.

Until now, little data was available on laundering in the region. However, a new study commissioned by the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) is shedding much needed light on these activities. The GIABA study was conducted in 2011 on 10 West African states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.

Although focused on money laundering through tax fraud, many important statistics emerged from the research. For instance, although West Africa’s population of 300 million is six times greater than that of South Africa, the latter’s GDP is greater than that of the former, illustrating the region’s dire financial situation.

The cash-based economy of West Africa and its porous borders also make the region highly vulnerable to money laundering, especially bulk cash smuggling. Criminals are also corrupting bank managers and personnel, and engaged in forgery of official documents, allowing them to bypass the few financial oversight processes in place.

As in all countries, money laundering damages the licit economy and further pushes countries to the brink of failure.

A 2013 GIABA report entitled: The Nexus between Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWS) and Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in West Africa takes a unique look at the connection between the illegal weapons trade and ML/TF in the region. According to this report, there are an estimated 8 million small arms and light weapons, or SALWs, such as AK-47s, rifles and pistols, in the hands of state and non-state actors in West Africa.

Illicit trafficking in SALW is a profitable business venture due to high demand and the ease of moving weapons across borders. Since weapons are manufactured external to the region, they all must be imported internationally.

Although the report does not establish a connection directly with Central or South America, the region certainly could be a conduit to the trade and could add weapons to drug shipments along thriving trafficking routes. The GIABA indicates SALW procurement from Côte d’Ivoire, a major transshipment area for Latin American drugs into Europe, is directly connected to the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and Russia.

SALW-related money laundering is conducted through local and international banks, real estate investments, and small retail business. This interesting graphic from the GIABA report illustrates connections between SALW and money laundering and terrorism financing in West Africa.

There is a close affinity between terrorism, money laundering and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The uncontrolled influx of small arms was the foundation for crisis prone environment in Nigeria that graduated into militancy and then full blown terrorism.

Challenges of Counter Terrorism

Counterterrorism is broadly defined as the sum total of state's concern with the identification, prevention and nullification of the effects of terrorist outrage, conducted through skillful intelligence acquisition, sensible precautions, planning and efficient anti-terrorist capability, and designed to restore law and order.

As a process that requires the selection of appropriate responses to unique situations, the crucial challenge often faced by policy makers rests on the question of the most appropriate strategy to adopt to suit a particular terrorist situation without violating international and human rights law.

Herein lays the challenge confronting the Nigerian law enforcement agents as components of the counter terrorism framework of the country.

Until the emergence of terrorism in 2009, the Nigerian security space has experienced several religious, industrial, social and political crises which were often short-lived and dealt with within the law enforcement mandate of the Nigeria Police.

In isolated cases, such internal security operations were undertaken with assistance of the military under the principle and practice of Military Assistance to Civil Authority (MACA) or Military Assistance to Civil Power (MACP) as recognised in the Nigerian Constitution.

Often, the military involvement in such operations was also short-lived as they transfer command and control to the police immediately law and order was restored.

Accordingly, some analysts believe that the Nigeria Police have relative experience in the management of ethnic, political and religious violence and that they have been successful within their existing institutional and human capacity to achieve a reasonable level of success in combating these sets of security challenges.

While this assertion may be difficult to scientifically verify as there is currently, no standard professional evaluation instrument within the Nigerian policing system to establish the level of police proficiency in this regard, in relation to terrorism, there is a consensus of opinion that being a new internal security trend, the Nigeria Police and indeed, the Nigerian security network lack the professional experience to expertly counter it within existing best international practices and within the dictates of rule

of law.

Late Gen. Andrew Azazi (rtd), the former National Security Adviser whose Office coordinated the counter terrorism operations of Nigeria alluded to this fact when in an address to pressmen shortly after an emergency National Council of State meeting summoned to review national security following the August, 2011 bombing of the UN House in Abuja observed that terrorism is a relatively new security challenge which neither the nation nor the security agencies are prepared for.

He hinted on the need to rejig the security architecture of the nation in order to effectively counter terrorism, while noting that it will take a while for the nation and security agencies to attain the operational capacity and professional orientation needed to pursue and effectively counter terrorism campaign within the dictates of best international practices.

The Nigerian counter terrorism experiment is an admixture of military and law enforcement strategies. It is woven around the concept of 'Joint Task Force' (JTF). The components of JTF are drawn from the military, police and State Security Service, but the command and control is exclusively vested in the military.

The implication is that counter terrorism initiatives of the country are led by the military, guided by military culture, and predominantly regulated by military laws and practices in relation to RoE and treatment of arrested terrorist suspects, while the law enforcement components are more or less playing back-up roles or what could be described as 'second-fiddle' role.

Not being the lead agency, it is a challenge for the Police to bring law enforcement standards to bear in an operational theatre in which the military plays the lead role, and in which most often, the military operate independent of other components of the JTF, take custody and debrief arrested suspects in line with military laws and practice, or even in some instances engage suspects with clear military intent, unlike the intent of the police which rests on use of minimum force for purpose of incapacitating, arresting and bringing to justice any arrested suspect.

Aside the challenges that arise from the counter terrorism architecture of Nigeria, a major challenge confronting law enforcement agents in relation to bringing terrorist elements to justice borders on security of witnesses. The nation's legal framework in relation to witness protection is weak. And for a matter touching on terrorism, it is often difficult to gain the attendance of vital witnesses in courts to prosecute terrorist offenders for fear of reprisal attacks by the terror network.

In similar vein, judges' protection in high-profile cases like terrorism trials also poses another tranche of challenge to law enforcement agents. This is because judges may be exposed to dangers and threats from terrorist network and, hence, requires special protection arrangement to give the confidence needed for an uninhibited trial process.

Conclusion

Organized crime and terrorism are no longer new in Nigeria and the contemporary world. They wreck severe havoc on both human and material resources. There are legal frameworks against terrorism and other forms of organized crimes in Nigeria.

What is left to be done is proper enforcement of the enabling laws. The courts must be able to fast track their trials to deliver judgments early enough in order to act as deterrent to others. There are trials that have been on for over two years that till date there is no judgment; yet matters of this sort are not supposed to be allowed to linger for too long before judgment is delivered.

It is important to mention that the approach of the Nigeria Police in tackling the challenges of organised crime and terrorism has been to shift emphasis from reactive policing strategies to intelligence-led policing strategy, enhance our investigative and prosecutorial competence, sharpen our operational competence, fashion a professional synergy with other components of the JTF and explore best international practices towards management of internal security challenges of the nature posed by organised crime and terrorism.

Our conviction is that it is only when these initiatives are fully optimised that the professional ability of the Nigeria Police Force to attain its counter terrorism mandate within the rule of law and within international best practices can be guaranteed.

From the intelligence perspective, it is our assumption that Intelligence-led policing aids in the identification of patterns of crime and identification and profiling of targeted offenders and their criminal enterprise. It also aids in the judicious utilization and prioritization of police resources towards crime prevention and operational planning while engendering efficient crime prevention and reduction outcomes.

The application of Intelligence-led Policing strategies discourages abuse of powers of arrest and pre-trial detention to the extent that police actions that usually account for pre-trial detentions would have been initiated and possibly completed through the application of discreet investigation element of intelligence practices before the arrest of the suspect.

The principle of intelligence-led policing describes how knowledge and understanding of criminal threats are used to drive law enforcement actions in response to threat of organised crimes.

To improve our overall responses therefore, we, as security professionals, must first improve our knowledge of intelligence and then use that to dissect organised crimes, and enhance operational efforts in the highest priority area, which as at today puts terrorism at the top within the Nigerian internal security space and in the global crime chart.

In order to do this in the most professional manner, operatives must constantly be exposed to the highest available level of training to grapple with the dynamics of the

intelligence world. This is expedient because intelligence gathering is an intellectually-demanding and technology-driven venture which demands constant training and re-training.

The current challenge of Boko Haram is a phase in Nigeria's evolutionary history. While this phase will pass, there are concerns as to whether the international community can aid the police in the development of sound professional capacity to identify indicators of future threats early enough through intelligence and deal with such decisively and within rule of law before it snowballs into another major internal security challenge that will warrant military involvement and clash between military law and civil/criminal law with attendant human rights violations.

Secondly, is whether the international community can also demonstrate the will to build a professionally competent Police Force that will play its prime role within the internal security profile prior to, during and after terrorism challenges, when the military must have withdrawn from the terrorist theatre and turn over the responsibility of law and order to the civil Police.

It is my hope that this forum will build a strong network that will complement local law enforcement initiatives as we struggle to cope with public pressure and pressure of the law in our law enforcement functions in relation to organized crime, terrorism and other crimes.

I thank you all

Ogunsakin, Assistant Inspector General of Police, delivered this paper at the 33rd International symposium on economic crime at Jesus College, University of Cambridge

<http://newmail-ng.com/>

Cameroon

Cameroun – Lutte contre Boko Haram : Rapport de l'International Crisis Group, un coup de machette dans l'eau

19/09/2015



Soldats camerounais patrouillant près de Fotokol (extrême nord du pays), près de la frontière entre le Cameroun et le Nigeria, le 17 février 2015. | © AFP / REINNIER KAZE

Le rapport de l'[International Crisis Group](#) (ICG) intitulé Cameroun : la menace du radicalisme religieux et publié ce 3 septembre 2015 vient à point nommé avec la recrudescence des attaques de Boko Haram contre le Cameroun depuis mars 2014. Cependant, l'utilisation d'une approche méthodologique englobant chrétiens pentecôtistes revivalistes, musulmans wahhabites et radicalisés violents de Boko Haram a dilué l'analyse, étouffant ainsi sa capacité de projection.

Lorsqu'on parcourt le document, il devient difficile de cerner la problématique centrale. Cela va dans tous les sens et les contradictions sont légions. Par exemple, le rapport constate qu'il existe des « *clivages intra-religieux* » dans le christianisme et l'islam camerounais mais recommande tout de même la mise en place de nouvelles formes de « *dialogue inter-religieux* ».

De plus, le rapport expose les techniques du prosélytisme wahhabite grassement financé par le « *gouvernement saoudien et des fondations et ONG qataries, koweïtiennes et égyptiennes* » mais omet d'analyser les techniques du prosélytisme des

églises revivalistes. Une analyse saillante aurait démontré que les églises revivalistes sont en grande majorité issues du tissu religieux local et donc en majorité financé par des adeptes qui se recrutent en majorité dans les plus basses couches de la pyramide sociale en quête de miracles. Ces canaux de financement divergents suffisent à disqualifier une analyse simultanée de l'islamisme radical et du christianisme revivaliste.

Le modèle économique des églises et leurs liens avec les élites politiques locales témoignent de l'intérêt qu'elles ont à la stabilité du Cameroun. Le rapport illustre par exemple que l'église du pasteur Tsala Essomba « *en plus d'avoir fait campagne pour Biya* » avait lancé une initiative de caisse commune devant servir à « *servir à financer les projets figurant dans le programme de campagne de Paul Biya.* » Cela me semble être une preuve que ces églises, quoique « *radicales* » ne versent pas dans l'extrémisme violent mais aspirent plutôt au maintien du régime politique actuel dans l'optique de sécuriser leurs sources de financement. Elles ne devraient donc pas faire l'objet d'une étude croisée avec le rigorisme islamique issu du wahhabisme importé.

On se trouve donc là face à une contradiction suffisamment puissante pour invalider l'hypothèse de recherche qui a orienté l'écriture de ce document.

Le rapport reconnaît que « *les musulmans du Cameroun ont condamné Boko Haram, qu'ils considèrent comme une secte non islamique qui n'a rien à voir avec le Coran* » et que les imams et les chefs traditionnels musulmans collaborent le plus souvent avec les forces de sécurité. Il propose également que la sécurité des chefs traditionnels musulmans soit renforcée, afin qu'ils puissent fournir de l'intelligence aux autorités administratives sans crainte de représailles de Boko Haram. Cet argument est un signe clair que la pratique de l'islam au Cameroun et même l'existence du courant rigoriste wahhabite ne tolère ni ne soutient la secte Boko Haram.

Au lieu de verser dans un amalgame contre-productif, le rapport de l'ICG aurait pu approfondir la réflexion sur les dangers qui guettent le pays. Il aurait été utile de porter l'analyse sur :

les processus de radicalisation individuels et collectifs dans l'Islam au Cameroun et surtout le passage du radicalisme au terrorisme violent matérialisé par Boko Haram.

les limites du système de collection de renseignements au Cameroun. Opérant généralement en silos, les services de sécurité, au Cameroun, ont un rendement sous optimal ; ceci crée des lacunes importantes dans le renseignement que Boko Haram pourrait exploiter à son avantage.

la transformation graduelle de l'armée camerounaise et de sa perception. D'instrument de protection du régime, elle devient progressivement le garant de la sécurité du peuple. Cette problématique est essentielle pour appréhender les mutations en cours depuis les premières attaques de Bo-

ko Haram, aussi bien dans l'armée conventionnelle que les forces spéciales (le BIRR). Plus que l'assemblée nationale ou le sénat, l'armée est désormais perçue comme la seule institution crédible et légitime.

Malgré la mine d'information et de données primaires qu'il pourvoie, le rapport de l'ICG sur-interprète le foisonnement religieux au Cameroun en se trompant de problématique. L'amalgame entre le radicalisme religieux dans les églises pentecôtistes, l'Islamisme extrémiste et le terrorisme violent de Boko Haram est le fruit d'une hypothèse mal alignée et d'une argumentation stérile qui noie de fait sa capacité de projection dans les recommandations disjointes que le rapport formule.

ICG aurait dû observer que le pentecôtisme et l'islam fondamentaliste évoluent dans des mondes à part en termes de modèle économique, de schéma de radicalisation et de basculement dans la violence. Les églises pentecôtistes sont ancrées dans l'écosystème domestique et leur modèle économique renforce le status quo politique et social plutôt qu'une transformation puritaniste prônée par l'islam wahhabite ou le sectarisme violent de Boko Haram.

Le Cameroun traverse une des périodes les plus turbulentes de son histoire. Il serait donc judicieux que l'ICG utilise sa crédibilité pour produire des analyses permettant au gouvernement et à ses partenaires d'orienter leurs actions pour éradiquer les menaces à la paix et la sécurité.

<http://www.camerpost.com/>

CAMEROUN :: EXTRÊME-NORD : RECRUESCENCE DES ATTAQUES DE BOKO HARAM :: CAMEROUN L'armée a pris de nouvelles mesures pour neutraliser les incursions de la secte.

La forte pression de l'armée nigériane dans l'Etat du Borno, conjuguée à l'inaction de la Force Multinationale Mixte (FMM), n'est pas sans conséquence sur la situation sécuritaire dans la région de l'Extrême-Nord, notamment dans les départements du Mayo-Sava, Logone et Chari et Mayo-Tsanaga. «Les terroristes de Boko Haram se sont émiettés en petits groupes, mobiles, et harcèlent nos positions le long de la frontière. Ils essayent d'étirer la ligne de front», commente un officier en poste dans le Logone et Chari. Résultat : incursions et embuscades se multiplient.

Pour la population, le prix à payer est très lourd. A Aïssa Hardé, dans le Mayo-Sava, ce sont 9 villageois qui ont été sauvagement tués par des combattants de Boko Haram dans la nuit du 16 au 17 septembre 2015. Le lendemain, ce sont trois bergers qui trouvaient la mort à Warami, après une attaque de la localité par des éléments de la secte. Quand les villageois réussissent à échapper, ils abandonnent leurs maisons et autres bétails à la merci des assaillants. 250 têtes de boeufs ont ainsi été emportées à Warami ; des maisons brûlées et du bétail emporté dans le village Madina entre Makary et Bodo, dans la nuit du 18 au 19 septembre 2015 ; deux troupeaux de bétail emportés entre Kangaleri et Abuja, dans la journée du 17 septembre 2015.

Les populations des villages frontaliers ne sont pas les seules à être visées par les attaques. L'armée camerounaise est ces derniers jours, une cible régulière. Elle a ainsi perdu à Ngoulma, dans la journée du 17 septembre 2015, sur la nationale n°1 entre Dabanga et Maltam, deux hommes et trois camions. Boko Haram a récidivé le matin du 19 septembre 2015 en attaquant un convoi sur l'axe Dabanga-Maltam. Face à la nouvelle donne, l'armée camerounaise fait montre d'une certaine résilience.

Dans la nuit du 16 au 17 septembre 2015, elle a pilonné des positions de Boko Haram dans les environs de Banki, au Nigeria. De sources concordantes, au moins 17 combattants de la secte ont perdu la vie. Toute la matinée du 20 septembre, l'artillerie de l'armée camerounaise a pilonné des positions de la secte à Banki et ses environs, pour permettre à l'armée nigériane de progresser. Mieux, les forces de défense et de sécurité multiplient les arrestations. Quatre membres de Boko Haram, les nommés Oumar Aga, Malloum Amada, Oumar et Baba Ali, ont été arrêtés à Kerawa, dans la journée du 17 septembre 2015. Une vingtaine d'autres personnes ont été interpellées à Zigagué, et transférées à Maroua dans la journée du 19 septembre 2015...

«En plus d'une réorganisation du dispositif dans le secteur Tildé-Dabanga, le génie militaire va travailler certaines parties de la nationale n°1 entre Mora et Kousséri pour assurer une certaine fluidité, car ces terroristes profitent de l'état de la route pour tendre des embuscades », explique un officier Camerounais. Les travaux de-

vraient démarrer, selon nos sources, très rapidement. D'après divers observateurs, le regain d'activités de Boko Haram aux frontières est le signe de son essoufflement. Une analyse relativement admise par certains officiers sur le terrain. «Oui, il y a une mutation qui s'est opérée avec la progression de l'armée nigériane dans l'Etat du Borno qui se traduit par la reconquête fulgurante des villes tenues autrefois par la secte. La résultante de cette situation est que nous avons désormais affaire à de petits groupes mobiles, dispersés sur une large bande frontalière entre l'Extrême-Nord et l'Etat de Borno, qui opèrent en plus dans leur registre favori : la guérilla.

Géographiquement, oui, Boko Haram a perdu du territoire, mais militairement, sa capacité de nuisance est toujours là. N'oublions pas que le groupe a tout simplement refusé de combattre l'armée nigériane, livrant juste quelques escarmouches pour ralentir son avancée. Le plus dur est à venir, quand les armées ne seront plus mobiles, quand elles vont se cantonner à sécuriser les villes, bref, quand elles vont s'arrêter. C'est en ce moment qu'il faudra résoudre bien de problèmes», explique un analyste. Un avis partagé par de nombreux militaires qui ne comprennent pas le discours distillé actuellement par des hommes politiques sur «l'essoufflement de Boko Haram». «De telles déclarations dans une guerre hybride où les critères d'appréciation restent flous, ne peuvent contribuer qu'à démobiliser les populations qui, croyant l'affaire réglée, peuvent baisser la garde», regrette un officier supérieur.

<http://www.camer.be/>

Le rapport d'ICG sur le radicalisme religieux au Cameroun: un signal d'alarme à point nommé

28/09/2015

Notre analyse du rapport de l'ICG sur le radicalisme religieux au Cameroun fait suite à la recrudescence des attaques terroristes de la secte islamiste Boko Haram (nouvellement dénommée Etat islamiste en Afrique de l'Ouest) dans le Septentrion Camerounais. La pertinence de ce rapport en ce moment crucial vient fondamentalement de ce qu'il met un accent majeur sur la nécessité de combattre le radicalisme religieux (soubassement du terrorisme) dès la base. La recrudescence des attaques terroristes dans le Septentrion Camerounais vient en effet attester de l'assise sociale dissimulée de cette secte dans cette région du pays, qui lui donne la possibilité de pourvoir persévérer et de recruter auprès des populations du Grand Nord.

Cette relecture analytique fait également suite aux critiques de Kodjo Tchioffo (publié ici à Camer.be et à le monde du 18 Septembre 2015) qui tendent à remettre en cause toute la pertinence d'un rapport donc l'ancrage empirique, l'approche pluridisciplinaire et la capacité de projection fondant ses recommandations sont indéniabiles.

e Prime abord, Kodjo Tchioffo ne saurait reprocher au rapport d'user d'une méthode englobante, car l'usage d'une méthode englobante (qui ne signifie pas monolithisme méthodologique) n'exclut pas la flexibilité méthodologique de l'analyste qui pourrait déployer les différentes variantes de l'unique méthode pour rendre compte d'une réalité sociale complexe et commune aux différents groupes religieux soumis ici à l'analyse scientifique.

De plus, la condamnation par Kodjo Tchioffo de la problématique développée par le rapport est non justifiée. En effet, l'orientation d'une problématique d'analyse n'est pas dogmatique, mais relève du choix délibéré de l'analyste qui au milieu de plusieurs possibilités de problématisation opte pour celle qui lui paraît la plus pertinente, en fonction de l'objet d'analyse élaboré. Et à juste titre, après avoir déblayé plusieurs pistes d'analyse, le rapport de l'ICG opte pour le grand risque de choc des radicalismes, qui s'ajoute au climat sécuritaire préoccupant du Cameroun : ce qui d'un point de vue sociostratégique n'est pas dénué de pertinence.

A la lecture du détracteur de l'ICG, l'on se pose pertinemment cette question : comment l'existence de clivages intra religieux rime-t-elle en contradiction avec la nécessité de mettre en place des plateformes de discussions interreligieuses, qui permettent aux différentes dénominations religieuses de dépasser leurs clivages internes ou externes afin de travailler plus harmonieusement pour la paix au Cameroun ? En effet, tout mouvement religieux persévérant dans le fanatisme, comme le

mouvement néo pentecôtiste camerounais, a tendance à se replier sur soi-même dans une logique d'auto justification d'une authenticité exclusive et à rejeter toute proposition de participation œcuménique ou interreligieuse. La capacité actuelle du gouvernement à offrir aux différentes dénominations religieuses une opportunité de légitimation sociale à travers leurs participations aux cérémonies publiques organisées par les pouvoirs publics est une heureuse occasion dont dispose ces pouvoirs publics de faire communiquer ces différentes dénominations religieuses entre elles. C'est dans cette piste que s'inscrit l'ICG.

Les techniques de prosélytisme des églises revivalistes sont pertinemment analysées dans ce rapport, et traduisent en des termes les plus accessibles au grand public les stratégies de ces leaders religieux usant de tout moyens d'atteinte du grand public (affiches publicitaire le long des grands axes routiers et grands carrefours, presse et radios privés ou publics, télé- évangélisme, pratique du porte à porte, etc.) en exerçant sur le public ce que des auteurs camerounais qualifie de séduction évangélique, comme mécanisme d'influence et de prosélytisme.

Les rapports des églises de réveil au pouvoir en place sont des rapports d'allégeance à celui qui est reconnu comme autorité voulue par Dieu, nous le concédons à la suite de Kodjo Tchioffo. Pourtant, il n'est pas exclu qu'en situation de basculement du Régime en défaveur de ces églises, elles tournent leur radicalisme et leur violence pour le moment symbolique contre la société et constitue une sérieuse entrave à la paix dans le pays. A titre d'illustration, en octobre 2013, les préfets du Nfoundi et du Littoral, respectivement chefs des Régions des capitales politique et économique du pays avaient procédé à la fermeture de plusieurs églises illégales dans les deux capitales.

C'est face à la menace de leurs pasteurs de soulever leurs fidèles contre le Régime en place que le Chef de l'Etat avait instruit de les rouvrir, et depuis lors, l'allégeance des églises à l'égard du pouvoir reste une attitude de reconnaissance. Pendant ce temps, toutes ces églises persévèrent dans l'illégalité, en attendant qu'on tente un autre jour de les ramener à l'ordre pour subir à nouveau leur chantage de destruction de la paix publique. Ceci nous amène à dire que ces églises, quoiqu'elles ne soient pas une menace réelle pour l'instant constitue une forte menace potentielle. Leur forte assise sociale et leur caractère centralisateur atour du charisme de leurs leaders font qu'en fonction des manipulations de ces derniers, ces églises sombreraient facilement dans la violence si le positionnement sociopolitique des pasteurs venait à le favoriser. De surcroit, de la violence symbolique à celle physique, il n'y a qu'un pas à franchir: celui du bouleversement du contexte sociopolitique local ou national, comme on l'a vu en République Centrafricaine avec les anti-balaka.

De plus, un grand nombre d'églises de réveil telles que la Winner Chapel International ou Life Ministry International obéissent comme le wahhabisme au schéma du financement et de la dépendance à l'international. Le radicalisme religieux des

églises revivalistes comme celui des musulmans wahhabites au Cameroun, constitue un fort potentiel de violence physique, qu'il ne faudrait pas sous-estimer. Le soutien de ces églises au pouvoir en place pour bénéficier de sa tolérance et des financements de ses barons, pour certaines d'entre elles, ne constituent pas une garanti infaillible et éternelle.

L'analyse de la situation sécuritaire à l'heure des attaques terroristes au Cameroun est un immense chantier qui pourrait être l'objet de plusieurs colloques pour dé-



mystifier les jeux et les enjeux de ce champ, dans ses aspects les plus diversifiés. Et chaque analyste qui arrive dans ce champ ne pourrait s'y prononcer qu'en fonction de ses sensibilités culturelles et scientifiques. Proposer une piste d'analyse est un acte de souveraineté, à condition que celle-ci s'avère pertinente aux yeux de plusieurs. Pourtant, contrairement aux prétentions quelque peu exacerbées de Kodjo Tchioffo, la proposition d'une piste d'analyse que l'on juge subjectivement plus pertinente n'autorise pas à discréditer et à disqualifier les autres pistes d'analyse.

Tout radicalisme extrémiste est une menace pour l'harmonie du vivre ensemble. Et c'est en fonction des contestes, des jeux et des enjeux des situations que même les radicalismes les plus subtiles se transforment en de puissantes armes de destruction de la paix.

Au-delà de la proposition de consolidation des forces vives de la nation autour des forces de maintien de l'ordre (que ce soit l'armée conventionnelle ou les forces spé-

ciales comme le BIR), le rapport propose de travailler pour une paix plus durable, à travers des espaces de dialogue harmonieux entre les différentes confessions religieuses. Ce qui n'est pas dénué de pertinence, car la situation de crise actuelle est une situation ponctuelle (nous le souhaitons) tandis que la coexistence de ces confessions est plus permanente et conditionne l'entrée ou non en conflit.

Le soutien des forces religieuses revivalistes au statu quo camerounais ne saurait être saisi comme une condition incommensurable de la paix sociale, dans la mesure où ce statu quo est lié à un régime politique qui non seulement manque de légitimité sociale mais qui plus est, constitue lui-même une menace potentielle pour la paix. Ce qui disqualifie la thèse de Kodjo Tchioffo qui voit dans ce soutien fort intéressé une condition infaillible de la paix au Cameroun.

Le pentecôtisme et l'islam fondamentaliste évoluent dans des mondes à part en termes de modèle économique, de schéma de radicalisation et de basculement dans la violence, cela ne fait pas de doute. Ce que le rapport de l'ICG ne manque pas d'ailleurs de reconnaître, car ne pas voir ces différences de trajectoire sociohistorique et cet écart culturel c'est faire preuve d'aveuglement intellectuel. Cependant, au-delà de ces écarts, l'islam fondamentaliste et le pentecôtisme camerounais ont des caractéristiques communes et une finalité commune, centre d'intérêt de ce rapport: le radicalisme religieux et par ricochet le prosélytisme aveuglant, quoi qu'à des degrés variés et usant des méthodes différentes.

Aller au-delà des propositions à court terme pour faire des propositions de construction d'une paix durable, c'est faire preuve de visionnaire, c'est dépasser la pléthore de recommandations qui fusent de partout, pour poser des touches d'originalité et inviter le gouvernement camerounais et les leaders sociaux à faire un travail de fond et en profondeur sur les dispositions psychosociales, véritables sources des conflits au sein d'une nation.

En somme, il faudrait admettre en toute honnêteté que ce rapport de l'ICG, comme toute analyse, n'est pas exhaustive (et ne saurait d'ailleurs prétendre à l'exhaustivité) ; mais il rend compte avec grande pertinence des réalités sous-jacentes au radicalisme sournois au Cameroun qui pourrait se greffer à long terme au climat sécuritaire camerounais. Le rapport débouche sur des recommandations fortes et appropriées qui mériteraient une grande attention du gouvernement camerounais et des partenaires du Cameroun.

<http://www.journalducameroun.com/article.php?aid=21626>

ISS: Mali's terrorists cast their web wider

, 28 September 2015

Recent terrorist attacks in central and southern Mali point to a deteriorating security situation in the country. The most recent attack occurred on 19 September at Bih, a in town Mali's central region of Mopti. The attack led to four deaths, two civilians and two police officers.

The terrorist threat, previously confined to the north, has spread to the rest of the country. This despite the presence of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the French military under Operation Barkhane. On 7 August, a hotel siege in Sévaré resulted in 13 deaths, of which four were MINUSMA employees.

The Macina Liberation Front (MLF) later claimed responsibility for the attack. On 10 June, an attack targeted at the National Gendarmerie in Misséni, located 20 kilometres from the Ivorian border, killed one and injured two soldiers. In March, Bamako became the scene of a terrorist attack in the restaurant, La Terrasse.

The MLF, to which this new outbreak of violence is largely attributed, first made its appearance in January 2015. The movement recruits mainly among the Peuhl community. It is reportedly comprised of former members of the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), one of the largest terrorist groups along with Ansar Dine, the group that occupied northern Mali in 2012. It is suspected that the leader of the MLF is Hamadoun Kouffa, a former preacher from the Mopti region.

Kouffa appeared alongside Iyad Ag Ghaly, the leader of Ansar Dine, when the group captured the city of Konna in January 2013. It is suspected that the two figures have been connected since 2000, when they were both militants of the religious Dawa movement. Kouffa's involvement with the MLF could therefore be the link between the different terrorist groups in the north, and those operating in the centre of the country.

The increased attacks and the emergence of new fronts to the centre and south of the country can be attributed to several factors. The first possible explanation is strategic. Terrorist groups operating in the north might be using attacks in the centre and south to strategically draw the attention of the Malian army and the international forces away from the north. Terrorist groups might be doing this to reorganise or continue their trafficking activities in the north.

Following investigations into the attacks in Misséni and Fakola – two towns in the Sikasso region – a number of former members of the Islamic police of Timbuktu were arrested in Bamako during the jihadist occupation in the north. The group that

led the attack claimed to be Ansar Dine in the south; an extension of Ansar Dine in the north. This too confirms that there is an operational link – or at the very least an ideological link – between the groups in the north and those in the centre and south of the country.

Finally, it can be noted that while central Mali has also felt the consequences of the insecurity in the north, it has not received the same attention from the Malian authorities. This has encouraged the creation of several self-defence militias in the centre. The option that they may also be trying to have their fair share of the peace dividend cannot be excluded.

Confronted with this growing terrorism threat, it is becoming increasingly clear that the national authorities and their international partners must adapt their responses. Despite several amendments to its mandate, MINUSMA never prioritised the fight against terrorism. Instead, it delegated this task to the French Operation Barkhane, which replaced Operation Serval in August 2014.

If Serval, with nearly 5 000 men at the height of the crisis, solely focused on Mali, this is no longer the case with Operation Barkhane, whose 3 000 troops are deployed across five Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). This change, combined with the reduction of Operation Barkhane military force in Mali, has prevented the mission from dealing effectively with the terrorist threat on the entire territory.

At the national level, despite the ongoing security sector reform and the support of the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM), the Malian Armed Force (FAMA) still faces many challenges. Besides the need to reinforce the capacity of the FAMA, the main challenge is the lack of military equipment. For instance, during the hostage-taking in Sévaré, Malian intervention forces were only able to reach the town thanks to MINUSMA's airpower. This illustrates the difficulties and challenges facing the Malian military in coping with a threat of this nature.

There have been some improvements that contributed to the Mali military's recent success in resisting and repelling the jihadists – as was the case in Nara on 27 June. However, there is still a long way to go to effectively secure the entire territory. Confronting the fast-spreading threat requires timely tactical mobility and intelligence.

Collaboration with the local population is also essential. This could facilitate the task of the FAMA, and prevent the abuses often associated with the fight against terrorism. In the region of Mopti, abuses perpetrated by the Malian army have become one of the driving causes behind the rise of the MLF. Engaging with the local population is therefore a crucial preventive measure, especially as the abuses have tarnished the image of the army and other state institutions.

The recent attacks should be a wake-up call for Malian authorities. Furthermore, it is an opportunity for in-depth reflection and analysis of the factors behind the emer-

gence and spread of terrorist attacks in areas that were previously spared. This reflection could result in the adoption of a national anti-terrorism strategy, which must be based on national realities and needs.

Written by Ibrahim Maïga, Junior Researcher, CPRA, Dakar

<http://www.defenceweb.co.za/>

Nigeria

Curbing Violence In Nigeria: Revisiting The Niger Delta – Analysis

September 30th, 2015



Location of Nigeria. Source: CIA World Factbook.

Violence in the Niger Delta may soon increase unless the Nigerian government acts quickly and decisively to address long-simmering grievances.

With the costly Presidential Amnesty Program for ex-insurgents due to end in a few months, there are increasingly bitter complaints in the region that chronic poverty and catastrophic oil pollution, which fuelled the earlier rebellion, remain largely unaddressed.

Since Goodluck Jonathan, the first president from the Delta, lost re-election in March, some activists have resumed agitation for greater resource control and self-determination, and a number of ex-militant leaders are threatening to resume fighting (“return to the creeks”).

While the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East is the paramount security challenge, President Muhammadu Buhari rightly identifies the Delta as a priority. He needs to act firmly but carefully to wind down the amnesty program gradually, revamp development and environmental programs, facilitate passage of the long-stalled Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) and improve security and rule of law across the region.

The Technical Committee on the Niger Delta, a special body mandated in 2008 to

advance solutions to the region's multiple problems, proposed the amnesty program, whose implementation since 2009, coupled with concessions to former militant leaders, brought a semblance of peace and enabled oil production to regain pre-insurgency levels. However, the government has largely failed to carry out other recommendations that addressed the insurgency's root causes, including inadequate infrastructure, environmental pollution, local demands for a bigger share of oil revenues, widespread poverty and youth unemployment.

Two agencies established to drive development, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA), have floundered. Two others mandated to restore the oil-polluted environment (particularly in Ogoni Land) and curb or manage hundreds of oil spills yearly, the Hydrocarbon Pollution Restoration Project (HYPREP) and the National Oil Spills Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), have been largely ineffective.

The PIB, intended to improve oil and gas industry governance and possibly also create special funds for communities in petroleum-producing areas, has been stuck in the National Assembly (federal parliament) since 2009. In sum, seven years after the technical committee's report, the conditions that sparked the insurgency could easily trigger a new phase of violent conflict.

The outcome of the presidential election has also heightened tensions. While most people in the region acknowledge that Jonathan lost, some former militant leaders and groups accept Buhari only conditionally. For instance, the Niger Delta People's Salvation Front (NDPSF), the civil successor to the militant Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), claims Jonathan's ouster was the product of a conspiracy by northerners and the Yoruba from the South West against the Delta peoples and the South East. Apparently influenced by that view, some groups are resuming old demands, hardly heard during the Jonathan presidency, for regional autonomy or "self-determination".

Local tensions generated by the polls also pose risks, particularly in Rivers state, where Governor Nyesom Wike (of ex-President Jonathan's People's Democratic Party, PDP) and ex-Governor Rotimi Amaechi (of President Buhari's All Progressives Congress, APC) are bitter foes. With many guns in unauthorised hands, politically motivated assassinations and kidnappings for ransom, already common, could increase.

Policy and institutional changes are necessary but, if not prepared and implemented inclusively and transparently, could themselves trigger conflict. Buhari has declared that the amnesty program, which costs over \$500 million per year, is due to end in December. He has terminated petroleum pipeline protection contracts that Jonathan awarded to companies owned by ex-militant leaders and the Yoruba ethnic militia, O'odua People's Congress (OPC), and may streamline the Delta's inefficient development-intervention agencies. He may also withdraw the PIB from parliament for revision. Some of this is desirable, even inevitable, but a number of former militant

leaders and other entrenched interests threaten resistance and a possible return to violence. A perception that the government's actions are reversing the Delta's gains could aggravate local grievances and precipitate armed violence.

At its peak in 2009, the insurgency in the Niger Delta was claiming an estimated 1,000 lives a year, had cut Nigeria's oil output by over 50 per cent and was costing the government close to four billion naira (nearly \$19 million) per day in counter-insurgency operations. A resurgence of violence and increased oil-related crime in the Delta could seriously undermine national security and economic stability, which is already weighed down by the Boko Haram insurgency and dwindling oil revenues.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To prevent a relapse to conflict and to build durable peace in the Niger Delta

To President Muhammadu Buhari:

1. Visit the Delta at the earliest opportunity to underscore commitment to the region and lay out a comprehensive plan for its security and development.

To the federal government of Nigeria:

2. Wind down the amnesty program gradually, while ensuring that ex-militants already registered complete promised training, but also demand greater transparency and accountability in the program's management.

3. Align ex-militant training with available employment opportunities.

4. Streamline regional development responsibilities, particularly by winding down the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA) and reforming the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) to make it a more accountable and effective agency and thereafter ensuring it is well-resourced.

5. Take urgent steps to stop environmental degradation by:

a) reviving the Hydrocarbon Pollution Restoration Project (HYPREP) as a statutory entity, independent from the petroleum ministry, and directing it to commence clean-up arrangements and operations in Ogoni Land and other adversely affected areas quickly;

b) strengthening the ability of the National Oil Spills Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) to respond to oil spills rapidly and effectively; and

c) discouraging the environmentally damaging proliferation of artisanal refineries by improving the availability of properly-refined petroleum products and creating long-proposed modular refineries across the region.

6. Strengthen security and rule of law, including by encouraging partnerships between security agencies and local communities in place of the pipeline protection

contracts awarded to ex-militant leaders and ethnic militia groups.

7. Work closely with the National Assembly to ensure speedy passage of the long-stalled Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) this legislative year, on the basis of compromise between Delta interests and those of other areas.

8. Prosecute those responsible for electoral violence and fraud, but also encourage communal and inter-party reconciliation, especially in Rivers state.

To the international community, particularly the European Union and the U.S. and UK governments:

9. Sustain and where possible increase support of existing programs, including those of civil society organisations, for conflict prevention, peace building, good governance, rule of law and development in the Niger Delta.

10. Offer technical, logistical and other capacity-building assistance to agencies promoting development, safeguarding and restoring the environment and curbing corruption, particularly the NDDC, HYPREP, NOSDRA and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC).

11. Strengthen collaboration with the government and other international partners in fighting oil theft, including by tracking proceeds of illicit enterprises.

To major oil companies, including Shell and ENI (NAOC):

12. Intensify efforts to curb pollution by upgrading or replacing aging infrastructure more regularly, installing more sensors for early detection of pipeline breaches, and giving greater support to NOSDRA and grassroots campaigns against artisanal refineries.

13. Intensify efforts to create jobs for local youth by increasingly outsourcing marginal jobs to local companies and utilising local materials and expertise in compliance with the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act.

14. Honour financial obligations more conscientiously, particularly to the NDDC, Nigeria Content Development Fund and Ogoni Environmental Restoration Fund.

15. Contribute more actively to fighting oil theft, particularly by instituting better metering at production points and more transparent oil-loading arrangements.

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Gombe: New ways to fight Boko Haram

September 22, 2015



- The chairmen and the DSS at the meeting

Hitting the insurgents from the air and outgunning them on the ground are just fine, but in Gombe State, the Directorate of State Services (DSS) is involving everyone, including council chiefs and residents, in strategies to keep the terrorists at bay. VINCENT OHONBAMU reports

This is not Boko Haram's finest hour. A rejuvenated military offensive is posting good results against its fighters, hitting them so hard that many of them are laying down their arms in surrender. Still, the authorities in Gombe State are not sitting back and waiting for the latest success story from the federal troops. They are constantly initiating their own anti-Boko Haram strategies.

For instance, the state government is building better protected markets and parks to make it harder for violent criminals to strike as they did months back, killing scores. Now, the Department of State Services (DSS) is driving a fresh campaign with every-

one playing a part. One point stressed at a workshop with caretaker council chairmen in Gombe, the state capital, was how to ensure that the bloodthirsty insurgents do not cash in on the state's open vast land to enter its communities unnoticed.

The characteristic short trees, shrubs and parched sandy plains of the Sahel Savannah of the Northeast make it easy to stand at one point and see as far as the eyes could travel, save for the abundant rocky ranges that adorn the terrain. The sparse vegetation made possible by the thin rainfall of the vegetative belt makes it possible to crisscross the terrain with or without established roads or pathways. The rocky or undulating nature of the zone's topography also makes for good hideouts because of the obstacles to smooth movement.

The DSS told the council chiefs to take the vigilance message to their areas and ensure that their people at the grassroots imbibe it. On noticing anything suspicious, they should quickly pass the information to the appropriate authorities. That way it would be easier to contain the schemes of the bad guys.

That was not all. Close circuit cameras are being installed to make kidnapping more difficult. Also, there are emergency numbers for residents to call. And when you speak in public, be careful in whose company you are and what you say. Do you feel like giving out cash to people? Good idea, but just be careful what information is passed on to characters who might use it against you or your loved ones.

Located in the expansive savannah belt, Gombe shares common boundaries with all five states in the northeast: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Taraba and Yobe, all interconnected through bush paths. The Udawa herdsmen who in the past created so much trouble and concerns for farmers, government and people of the state had no other routes but these bush paths.

Aware of this vulnerability, the new State Director of Security (SDS) in the state DSS command, Mr. Reuben Amao convened a two-day workshop to enlighten the newly constituted caretaker chairmen of the 11 local government areas of the state on security tips and how to deal with security situations that may occur in their domains.

The SDS said the workshop was informed by a thorough analysis of trends and manifestations of security threats which indicated that Boko Haram insurgents and other criminals usually enter the states through bush paths in rural areas.

"The idea of convening the workshop by this command was informed after a thorough and meticulous timeline analysis of the trends and manifestations of security threats, particularly those of insurgency being orchestrated by Boko Haram group, which indicated that the insurgents and other members of criminal gangs usually accessed the state through bush paths along villages at the rural areas.

"To effectively checkmate movements of these elements into the state, there is the need to alert and re-awaken the consciousness of the newly appointed Caretaker Committee Chairmen, who are the Chief Security Officers of their respective local

government areas”, said Amao who was bringing to the fore his experience, having been the Director of the state command.

Objectives of the workshop according to him, included: “To equip the newly appointed Caretaker Committee Chairmen with requisite security tips to aid in the discharge of their responsibilities.

“To sensitise them on security threats prevailing in their areas and proffer practical solutions; to adopt security strategies collaboratively to achieve security goals and to critically examine security lapses at the LGAs with a view to nipping them proactively.”

The Chairmen were also given tips on personal security, security of home/office environments and security of documents as well as the need to properly use the security apparatus (operatives) at their disposal so that others do not hijack the apparatus and turn them against the council bosses.

The Deputy Governor of Gombe State, Mr. Charles Iliya who declared the workshop open on behalf of his boss reminded the Chairmen that much was expected from them in every respect. He urged them to put the lessons into practice, adding that the workshop was the first of its kind in the state.

He told them to be careful, patient, tactful and logical in dealing with people in order to get the best of their cooperation, especially in the area of security tips.

Reverend Timothy Burak, the Caretaker of Shongom Local Government Area who responded on their part described the workshop as exhaustive and that they had definitely learnt a lot, while promised bring the lessons to bare in the discharge of their responsibilities at their respective localities.

<http://thenationonlineng.net/>

Pourquoi Boko Haram reste l'un des groupes terroristes parmi les moins connus au monde

21/09/2015

Parce qu'il est très difficile d'infiltrer les rangs du groupe terroriste.

Boko Haram fait depuis plusieurs années les gros titres de la presse internationale en multipliant des attentats dévastateurs au Nigeria et dans les pays frontaliers du lac Tchad (Cameroun, Tchad et Niger). Le groupe terroriste a encore semé la terreur dimanche 20 septembre dans la ville de Maiduguri, dans le nord-est du Nigeria, [en faisant exploser deux bombes](#). Si elle a été affaiblie par les offensives de la coalition des armées des pays de la région, la secte islamique demeure néanmoins méconnue pour plusieurs raisons, [comme l'explique le site African Arguments dans une longue analyse](#) (en anglais).

«Boko Haram est probablement la mieux connue des insurrections armées méconnues dans le monde d'aujourd'hui», note dans une belle figure de style le blogueur nigérian Fulan Nasrullah sur African Arguments.

La principale raison à ce flou qui entoure encore l'organisation terroriste est la très grande difficulté pour les services de renseignements africains ou occidentaux à in-



Des Tchadiens saluent le Président du Nigeria, Muhammad Buhari, le 11 juin 2015. Photo: REUTERS/Afolabi Sotunde

filtrer le groupe. Boko Haram exerce en effet une surveillance étroite à tous les étages de son processus de recrutement, et ne recrute presque que des hommes issus de régions du nord-est du Nigeria, le fief des insurgés.

Nigeria: Boko Haram - Why the World Needs to Help Nigeria and Her Neighbours Now

OPINION

By Nwachukwu Okafor

President Buhari, last month, while on a visit to the President of Benin Republic, made a statement, that he hoped that Boko Haram the insurgent group fighting the Nigerian Army to establish a caliphate in North Eastern Nigeria, will be defeated by the end of the year. Again, recently after swearing in a crop of newly appointed military chiefs, the President asked them to defeat Boko Haram in three months.

I like that President Buhari is an optimist. I also like the fact that Nigeria is being led by a seasoned General. One who has been to the best war colleges and seen action in a conventional battles. Nigeria's Commander-in-Chief, is eminently qualified to make military projections, he also knows the officers that he recently appointed. That might have informed his confidence. My honest prayer is that Mr. President's projections and charge to his officers will produce the required results.

I am no military strategist. I am also not a retired army officer. My closest association with military will be my interest in military strategy and history, yet I know that, the war that with Boko Haram is not a conventional war, it is an insurgency and history has shown that unless where the strategy is right, insurgencies last for a long time. There is therefore an urgent need for a robust and concerted effort by the international community to assist Nigeria and her neighbors in their effort to crush these atrocious criminals.

Insurgency: Causes and Analysis Art Ryan L. Seachon in his article, Insurgencies in history: A blueprint for future strategy defined insurgency as an "organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict" He further amplified it as "a form of modern warfare" stating that, "differences in ideology and faith, problems of underdevelopment and poverty, and social dissatisfaction are some of the main issues that have given rise to insurrections in many countries.

Historically the longest insurgency is the one being waged by the Communist Party of the Philippines under the auspices of the New People's Army (NPA) and sister groups. This insurgency dates back to the early 19th-20th centuries and continued to the 1950s and later metamorphosed into what is today known as the New People's Army (NPA). Over the years efforts by the army to win this war through conventional means have been met with limited success.

One cannot fail to recall the engagement of US forces in the Vietnam War from 1st November 1955 to the fall of Saigon on April 30. 1975, writing about that war, Jennifer Rosenberg a 20th century history expert stated as follows,

"U.S. troops fought a jungle war, mostly against the well-supplied Viet Cong. The Viet Cong would attack in ambushes, set up booby traps, and escape through a complex network of underground tunnels. For U.S. forces, even just finding their enemy proved difficult. Since Viet Cong hid in the dense brush, U.S. forces would drop Agent Orange or napalm bombs which cleared an area by causing the leaves to drop off or to burn away. In every village, U.S. troops had difficulty determining which, if any, villagers were the enemy since even women and children could build booby traps or help house and feed the Viet Cong. U.S. soldiers commonly became frustrated with the fighting conditions in Vietnam. Many suffered from low morale, became angry, and some used drugs".

The above analysis by Rosenberg sounds very familiar. It would appear that Ms. Rosenberg was describing the challenges of the Nigerian Army in Maiduguri, or Bama, or Gamboru Ngala or even Sambisa forest in North Eastern Nigeria. Such apt similarities in insurgent wars show why conventional methods of addressing them have failed woefully over the centuries. The United States Army left Vietnam without achieving their objectives. Till date Vietnam is unified under a communist government.

Protagonists of conventional wars ruled world armies for centuries, unfortunately the events of 9/11 which resulted in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which has defied conventional means has forced a reassessment of methodologies used in the fight against insurgencies.

John Nagl author of Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice, and a West Point graduate and Professor with a PHD on counter insurgency from Oxford has this to say about the US war in Iraq and Afghanistan,

"When the U.S. Military found itself bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan in the years after 9/11, it was forced to rediscover the tenets of counterinsurgency—a strategic approach to war-fighting that had been all but forgotten following the unpleasant ending of the conflict in Vietnam. That transformation was led in large part by a small cadre of officers who had studied guerrilla warfare at a time—the 1990s—when few thought this arcane discipline had any relevance for future conflict". He further stated that, "In a counterinsurgency, the soldiers would discover, the chief challenge was not to kill but rather to identify an enemy that often hid in plain sight"

Professor Nagl and his group who included General David Petraeus, who had written his Princeton Ph.D. thesis on the Vietnam War are known as the "COINdinista, a term used to describe the cadre of officers within the US Army who advocated for and developed a counter Insurgency Doctrine with, " emphasis on population protection and establishment of legitimate and effective governance structure". This group is ideologically opposed to the group who views military operations as one way traffic of elimination of the enemy and declaring victory. Unfortunately modern conflicts have defied this approach and are forcing armies of the world to view counter insurgency from the prism of the COINdinistas.

Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria, No Longer a Local Affair Since its founding in Nigeria, in 2002, Boko Haram has defied all conventional military approaches. Nigeria has failed as it were to defeat a supposed rag tag army and has now moved its military headquarters to Maiduguri in Northern Nigeria, so as to have commanders near the front lines. What started as an "orthodox", "ultraconservative religious sect, which abhors foreign education, soon became a full blown insurgency that is now operating in Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroun and is threatening West African regional stability.

This turn of events started after the fall of Mummer Kaddafi of Libya. Remnants of Gaddafi's army moved down south and found bases at the northern borders of Nigeria. Boko Haram suddenly began to operate with armored carriers and Toyota hi-lux trucks and superior arms and ammunition. They soon started taking territories within Nigeria and announced the birth of a caliphate. A demoralised Nigerian army bogged down by corruption of its top commanders buckled under incessant attacks. Within a couple of months Boko Haram started attacking targets inside Niger, Chad and Cameroun. What started as a Nigerian problem has now become a big headache for all the leaders of countries that share a boarder with Nigeria.

Boko Haram recently pledged allegiance to the so called Islamic State ISIS. Very recently a high level ISIS operator Ahmad al-Assir who had spent two years on the run after clashing with the Lebanese army was arrested at the Beirut International Airport on his way to Nigeria. It is therefore no longer in doubt as to where and how help and logistics have been getting to Boko Haram Commanders.

This turn of events should concern everyone who desires peace in the West African sub region and around the world. The challenge being faced by the heads of governments especially Nigeria is no longer a local problem and should concern the international community. It is unconscionable for world powers to sit back why African countries are being bogged down by a challenge which requires immediate assistance and unconventional ways to tackle.

The United States of America has developed practical methods of combating insurgency which so far has led to some measured success in Iraq and Afghanistan. President Obama should immediately come to the aid of the West African sub region and advance workable solutions with other world leaders to end this insurgency. President Buhari has vowed to defeat Boko Haram but needs the help of the international community to do so.

Amplifying the Coindinista: Strategy for Winning this War and Rebuilding Affected Areas Successive governments in the West African sub region have neglected the masses and created a massive population of poor people whom the insurgents are promising a better life in their Eldorado kingdom.

Unconfirmed security reports show that Boko haram fighters are paid about a \$1000.00 a month. In a region where people survive on a less than \$1.00 a day, such

payments are a huge inducement for people to join the insurgents. Very worrisome is news that some of the fighters are college graduates and even people who are non-Muslims. Although it is very convenient to blame religion as one of the causes of the Boko Haram insurgency, the atrocities of this sect has shown beyond all reasonable doubts that, they are criminals masquerading as religious fanatics, for there is nothing in their methods that resembles the Moslem faith.

Neglect of our poor and their inability to live to their full potentials in the midst of plenty has provided a recruitment ground for this monster that has become an albino in the West African sub region. The assertion by Art Ryan above that, underdevelopment, poverty, and social dissatisfaction as some of the main issues that have given rise to insurrections in many countries are so true of this region.

Insurgency is an octopus. It is no conventional war. The enemy is not known. The biggest challenge of any military is how to achieve a sustainable peaceful solution with minimal casualty. This objective is very difficult to achieve, however, as Professor Nagl has shown, counter insurgency approach has proven to be better than conventional warfare. These methods should include, effective governance structures, Psychological warfare, aggressive rebuilding of civilian infrastructures and Amnesty.

Effective Governance Structure The regional co-operation put in Place by President Buhari, should urgently engage village heads and community leaders in the sub region. The traditional institutions should be engaged in governance. This measure should start from bottom up. The Government, have been using a top bottom approach against Boko Haram, while Boko Haram has been doing the opposite. In counter-insurgency bottom to top approach in governance is the most effective way. The military should immediately use the local authorities at the village head level and build confidence from bottom up.

This insurgency has destroyed towns market, farm lands, schools, Hospitals, roads etc. International aid is needed to start immediate reconstruction of infrastructures and deployment of forces to protect them. The only way to secure a lasting peace is by assuring the populace of a long term commitment to reconstruction and security.

It should be noted that counterinsurgency, is a very expensive venture. The United States have spent twice the entire budget of the Afghan government in one year. The international community and regional governments of West Africa should therefore be prepared to meaningfully engage in winning this war. They should be able to match the adversaries and do better. The international community can no longer fold their hands and watch Africa spend our scarce resources on a war that has international dimensions.

Psychological Warfare Boko Haram has been effective in wearing a religious cloak on its criminal activities. There should be a concerted effort at psychological orientation of the citizens. Religious leaders should also be engaged to inculcate in people the true meaning and worship of Allah, the Supreme God.

Amnesty The regional governments should immediately declare an amnesty, welcome back and de-program any fighters who have been involved with Boko Haram. This system has been employed effectively in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria and can be used again. The lessons learnt from the Amnesty declared in the Niger Delta can be deployed to achieve lasting peace among the countries that are affected by this insurgency. Any foreign fighters arrested should be transported to The Hague or at any special courts established for this purpose, where they will be subjected to international rules. Again this is where the assistance of the international community is needed. Involvement of international agencies will ensure that suspected insurgents go through a process of adjudication that guarantees their rights to a fair trial under international law.

Rapid Intervention Force One core tenet of the counter-insurgency is the development of a quick intervention force. The regional force fighting Boko Haram, should develop elite and very lean forces which can deploy at the shortest notice and be ready to repeal attacks when they occur. Insurgents are not regular armies. They thrive on the surprise element, therefore the military should also have units that can move with agility and speed and when the chance arrives decisively crush the enemy. Intelligence gathering will go a long way in locating and alienating the enemy. There should be zero abuse of captured insurgents and terrorists as abuse hardens the hearts and minds of frontline terrorists and insurgents.

Insurgent wars from historical records are a long engagements; victory will come in short increments. The new President of Nigeria has shown leadership in the region. He is shown a strong commitment to combat Boko Haram with the help of the heads of governments in the West African sub region. Time has come for the international community to treat Boko Haram as a threat to world peace. The Nigerian government in concert with the regional force fighting Boko Haram needs help now. Any

--Nwachukwu Okafor, a Lawyer and Policy analyst wrote from Cary, North Carolina.

<http://www.thisdaylive.com/>

Somalia

Why al Shabaab is still a formidable threat to the region

September 24, 2015



Al Shabaab Militia. Photo/File

It's been two years since the Westgate attack. It was a fatal mistake for government to block an independent credible enquiry into the attack. No lessons were learnt. And due to this indolent and incompetent character of the government, on April 2, 147 students were killed at Garissa University College in similar circumstance.

What cannot be missed in both attacks is the incompetence, unprofessional and ill-prepared response of the government.

Kenya's security design and ideology has changed little post-independence. Law enforcement agencies are trapped in regime policing of the colonial times and carried over by post-Independence governments. They are agents of rule not governance. The agencies have been compromised to secure political interests rather than the people and the country.

Apart from lacking a national security strategy, Kenya has no solid integrated crime prevention and law enforcement policy. There are weaknesses in setting national security policy priorities, implementation planning and accountability system.

This raises the fundamental question: how does Parliament approve a security and defence budget without a corresponding policy and implementation plan?

The problem is exacerbated by the lack of integration, coherence and coordination of security structures; dysfunctional joint security and intelligence assessments by civilian and operational agencies.

There's nonexistent or limited accountability in resource allocation and use; a severe deficit in effective oversight mechanisms; and inappropriate emergency preparedness and response coordination.

Security sector reforms are not equivalent to appointing personnel and or changing of the guard at the helm.

Al Shabaab came about in 2006 after US-backed Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia to drive out Islamic Union Courts.

KDF rolled into Somalia in 2011. There has never been a comprehensive audit analysis report on its activities and achievements, if any, presented to Parliament.

This despite the 2010 constitution expressly stipulating that national security is subject to the authority of the constitution and Parliament, and that security organs are subordinate to civilian authority.

Kenya's military was absorbed into the framework of Amisom. The core objectives of Amisom are threefold: first, decapitate and degrade al Shabaab's ability to launch attacks from across the border.

Second, create the right environment for the establishment of a proper functioning government and governance institutions, including security agencies, in Somalia.

Third, provide space for provision of humanitarian assistance and start the process of state and livelihoods reconstruction.

In the last few weeks, al Shabaab has launched deadly attacks in Mogadishu and ambushed Amisom troops, causing significant deaths. In the latest ambush, 19 Ugandan troops were killed. Burundian soldiers had earlier been ambushed and killed.

Although the group's key leaders have been killed by drone strikes, the attacks signify a rejuvenated al Shabaab. Amisom has announced a new offensive.

But why does Amisom appear not to have full control of the situation on the ground?

First, its command and control is still incongruent. There is no integration of the Amisom troops. Countries contributing troops to Amisom still have significant say in the management, control and decision-making of their troops.

Second, intelligence gathering and community partnerships are weak.

Third, Amisom is applying conventional strategy to tackle a militia whose war strategy has metamorphosed. Al Shabaab has adopted a very lethal guerrilla insurgency

warfare strategy. It has spread out its operations across wide range of areas. This over-stretches Amisom and creates many openings for the group to create havoc.

Fourth, Amisom has concentrated on capturing and controlling urban areas. Al Shabaab is controlling large parts of rural areas, giving it space to remain organised and embed within the community.

Fifth, while Amisom has a significant number of troops on the ground (though not enough), the troops lack well organised and sufficient air power for reconnaissance, attack and quick assistance operations.

Sixth, al Shabaab runs a well-organised communication, messaging and propaganda machine. This, together with its ability to control huge rural areas, makes it very effective in recruiting and gaining support.

Seventh, Somalia has a weak government that is in perpetual transition. This makes it impossible to achieve stability and consolidate the peace and security efforts.

Finally, al Shabaab seems to enjoy a substantial resource base locally and in neighbouring countries

- See more at: <http://www.the-star.co.ke/>

Uganda

These are the top four Lord's Resistance Army leaders captured or killed since 2011

September 29



US soldiers assist Ugandan Airforce personnel as they package food supplies at a military airbase in Entebbe, Uganda on December 6, 2011. (MICHELE SIBI-Getty Images)

As the U.S.-backed operation to find Joseph Kony, the elusive leader of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), [enters its fifth year](#), here is a look back on some of Kony's top commanders that have been captured or killed since 2011.

For those unfamiliar, the LRA has been active since 1986, making it "one of Africa's oldest, most violent, and persistent armed groups," according to [a profile](#) on the U.S. State Department's website. The LRA until 2006 operated in Uganda, where after a brutal conflict that displaced more than 2 million people, it retreated into the border regions between the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan (now South Sudan). According to a 2006 UNICEF report, between 1986 and 2005 the LRA abducted more than 66,000 children. While most were released shortly after capture, some were forced into becoming child soldiers or sex slaves.

Currently, the LRA has been reduced to a little more than 200 soldiers after years of defections and military operations have riddled its ranks. In 2011, U.S. forces began

assisting Ugandan troops to find the remainder of Kony's forces.

To date, these are the top commanders that have been captured or killed since then.

1) **Lt. Col. Binansio "Binany" Okumu:** Reported to be head of Kony's operation in the Congo and responsible for ivory smuggling, Okumu was killed after an engagement with the Ugandans in 2013.

2) **Maj. Gen. Ceasar Achellam:** In 2012, Ugandan forces captured Achellam in the Central African Republic. According to the advocacy group [Invisible Children](#), he was one of Kony's two sub-commanders and had formal military training. His ability to speak Arabic also made him a key liaison between the LRA and the Sudanese government.

3) **Maj. Gen. Okot Odhiambo:** The body of Kony's number two was supposedly recovered earlier this year, although DNA tests were required (and still pending) to verify the identity of a body that had been buried in 2014. It is not the first time a LRA leader was thought dead. In 2006, Brig. Gen. Dominique Ongwen was thought to have been found dead, but DNA tests proved the body was not his. Instead, Ongwen was captured eight years later.

4) **Brig. Gen Dominique Ongwen:** After getting a \$5 million bounty slapped on his head by the United States in 2013, Ongwen was picked up by Seleka rebels in northern CAR and handed over to U.S. troops in January. According to the BBC, Ongwen was abducted by the LRA when he was 10 and was forced to fight. He rose quickly through the ranks, earning the rank of major at 18 years old. He was the youngest person ever to be indicted by the International Criminal Court in 2005, according to the BBC.

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/>

Terrorism in the World

Afghanistan

Afghanistan: Political Gridlock Raises Threat Of Civil War – Analysis



Afghanistan's Ashraf Ghani shakes hands with Abdullah Abdullah. Photo Credit: U.S. Department of State, Wikimedia Commons.

September 30th, 2015

The 70th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) will take place in New York City this week and there will be 160 global leaders in attendance. After being absent for almost 10 years from the UNGA, Russian President Vladimir Putin will be delivering a speech along with Cuban President Raul Castro. This year, global leaders will be focusing on sustainable development and international security; mostly dealing with the Syrian-Iraqi conflict with Islamic State, the Ukrainian conflict, and the Afghan conflict. Leaders will be aiming to find a solution to the outbreak of refugee crisis.

This all shines light on the fact that, after 14 years of effort by US and NATO to restore peace and order in Afghanistan, the country is still very much at risk of becoming a safe haven for terrorist groups. The Taliban and other insurgent groups are capable of actively operating across Afghanistan. Moreover, the central government in Kabul remains divided after last year's election and Afghanistan remains an unstable nation, making Afghan refugees the second-largest group on the move behind the Syrians.

With the end of NATO's mission in 2014, and due to changes in the Afghan leadership and foreign aid inflows, Afghanistan has experienced three major transitions. The country is experiencing political, military, and socio-economic transitions simultaneously, causing delays, obstacles, and challenges for the newly established democratic institutions in Kabul. It has been a major challenge for Afghan leaders to deal with negative outcomes stemming from these transitions, and make needed adjustments within the Afghan political system.

It is important to keep in mind that these three major transitions are happening at the same time. Consequently, it will take several years to make the appropriate adjustments to Afghan democratic institutions. For instance, Tunisia was a stable state during the Zine El Abidine Ben Ali regime from 1989 to 2011; however, after undergoing a political transition during the Arab Spring of 2011, the country is still in chaos, with high unemployment among the youth population and the emergence of Islamic fundamentalist Wahhabi movements across Tunisia. Compared to the Tunisia of 2011, which only underwent a political transition, one can argue that the national unity government is maintaining government functions smoothly as it tries to restore consistency and stability to Afghanistan.

Afghanistan's Hybrid Presidential System

Divisions among the leaders of the national unity government (NUG) has become a major obstacle to adjusting to national circumstances. In addition, the newly created 'hybrid presidential system,' with Dr. Ghani as president and Dr. Abdullah as chief executive officer, is another challenge. The power-sharing deal between Ghani and Abdullah has caused a lot of disagreement and delays on governmental projects. Similar examples can be found in the national unity governments of Cambodia in 1993, and Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2008, and in every case the outcome wasn't positive. Taking into consideration Afghanistan's ethnic divisions, this newly hybrid-presidential system may contribute to ethnic conflicts and even lead to another civil war. It is important to understand that the majority of Afghan leaders were former warlords and today these very individuals are also part of the national unity government.

Furthermore, it is wrong to believe that the NUG is in political crisis; perhaps it is better to use the term "political gridlock" to describe the current situation. Former Intelligence Chief Amrullah Saleh claims that the NUG is having a crisis of leadership and management because both leaders are not capable of delivering on policies. Both President Ghani and CEO Abdullah have open lines of communication, but they lack the ability to perform strategic planning and coordination in their day-to-day decisions. Under the present leadership, the government is becoming weaker. The result is tragically predictable: Taliban fighters are gaining more territories in the northeastern part of the country and lately they were able to re-capture most of Helmand province. The NUG administration also promised to fight widespread corruption and implement electronic identity cards for all Afghan voters to prevent fu-

ture election fraud. It had also vowed to reform the electoral system itself. These projects now seem to be on hold indefinitely.

From a security perspective, NATO's quick withdrawal had a significant impact on Afghanistan's security services. The security situation has remained stable in major cities, but it is deteriorating in the villages. Earlier this month, it was reported by TOLO News that ISIS (Daesh) have consolidated their power in Nangarhar province, where Daesh are presently operating prisons and have taken 150 people hostage. According to reports they managed to kill 600 people in the past month. Also, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan (ISI) is flexing its muscle further into Afghanistan, because insecurity has significantly increased in the northern part of Afghanistan. In a leaked report in 2006, the British Defense Ministry claimed that ISI is significantly involved in supporting insurgents against the government in Kabul and that the Pakistani spy agency might have even been involved in the 2005 London bombings. This security deterioration in the rural areas of Afghanistan is getting worse, and if this matter is not taken seriously, insecurity will begin to impact the entire country. After being elected as the first vice-president of Ashraf Ghani in October of 2014, General Dostum once America's greatest ally against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, has joined the Afghan National Army on the frontlines to fight against insurgents in Faryab province. This move by the four star Afghan general has also boosted the moral of Afghan security forces. It is the first time in Afghan history that an Afghan political leader is willing to leave the presidential palace to fight against the enemy alongside with the National Army on the frontlines.

During the months of July and August 2015, General Dostum, along with his two sons, launched a massive military operation to clear Faryab province from insurgents. Under General Dostum's clearance operation, the Afghan National Army was capable of clearing several districts in Faryab, such as; Baland Ghor, Khetai, Katawolang, Tagab Erak, Qowchin, Khwaja Kenti and Sari Cheshma. The Khaama Press reported on August 20th 2015 that several senior Taliban leaders were killed and also a Pakistani General of Inter-Intelligence Services (ISI) was shot in his left eye and died during the operation. General Dostum claims that this is accurate proof that Pakistan directly supports the Taliban and Daesh in Afghanistan. According to some sources, there are 3,000 Taliban fighters stationed in Faryab province and also the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has provided 500 militiamen to fight alongside the Taliban. The province of Faryab is strategically important for the insurgents, because Faryab is the gateway to the other northern provinces. If the insurgents consolidate their power in Faryab province, they will be able to penetrate districts in Balk province and destabilize Mazar-e-Sharif and also promote instability in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in the near future. Commander Mohammed Zakaria from the 209th Shafeen Corps responsible for the security of the Northern Province claims that Kunduz province remains the traditional operation base for the insurgents and a major military campaign is also being planned to clear insurgents from Kunduz province in September 2015.

The Pakistan Factor

Foreign spies are active inside the Afghan Presidential Palace in Kabul. Possibly rumors; however, these double agents were also able to participate in important meetings. The presence of these foreign agents in the heart of Kabul has a significant impact on this newly hybrid-presidential system. During a session of the Council of Ministers in Kabul last month, CEO, Abdullah claimed that the presence of double agents or enemy spies within the Afghan government ranks are more dangerous than the insurgents, because they provide valid intelligence for the Taliban and other insurgents. He also claimed that the presence of these spies from the neighboring countries are part of the NUG's inheritance, and this has caused political gridlock. Moreover, former Jihadi leader Abdul Rab Rassoul Sayyaf claimed this month that most terrorist attacks against major Afghan cities were plotted from the Presidential Palace in Kabul due to the presence of "double agents inside the Afghan political system." Often, these double agents in Kabul are referred to the fifth pillar in the government, because they play an important role in the decision-making of the NUG. On September 21st 2015, the Afghan Parliament's Internal Security Commission requested that the Afghan spy agencies (NDS) identify these so-called double agents in Kabul.

In June 2015, President Ghani signed the controversial intelligence Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Pakistan; the aim of this agreement was to enhance cooperation between Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security (NDS) and Pakistan's Intelligence Service (ISI) in their fight against terrorism and separatists. However, this Memorandum of Understanding has been strongly criticized by former president Hamid Karzai, CEO Abdullah Abdullah, and by all levels of the Afghan government. In a sense, the signing of this memorandum is like selling the sovereignty of Afghanistan to Pakistan and allowing the sworn enemy of Afghanistan to penetrate deeper inside the Afghan security services and be able to manipulate key Afghan government agencies in Pakistan's favor. It is also important to keep in mind that the final document of the MoU was signed by President Ghani and ISI without informing or consulting the CEO Abdullah. Thus, former president, Hamid Karzai informed Dr. Abdullah about the ratification of MoU agreement. During the formation of the National Unity Government in 2014, it was decided the CEO should be able to participate in bilateral decision-making meetings with the president. However, the signature of MoU document by President Ghani without the CEO's consent confirmed that the president did not respect the terms. In addition, this showed that the NUG remains divided and they do not speak with a single voice. The chief executive officer position is written in the Afghan constitution and will consequently end in two years. President Ghani will have to hold a loya jirga meeting in two years, in order to amend the Afghan constitution and create the position of the prime minister for Dr. Abdullah.

Another example illustrating weakness and division among key NUG leaders is the decision taken by the first vice-president, General Dostum to launch a military oper-

ation to clear Faryab province from insurgents. This decision was taken unilaterally by General Dostum with the support of the acting provincial governor of Northern Balkh province, Ata Mohammad Noor. This new military alliance in Northern provinces between General Dostum and Governor Noor is very controversial, because this alliance is reminiscent of the Afghan civil war of the 1990s. On September 13th 2015, Khaama press reported that General Dostum is willing to lead another operation against ISIS in Nangarhar province. General Dostum's military operation to clear insurgents from Faryab province was very effective and the citizens of Nangarhar province agreed to fight with General Dostum side-by-side like brothers against ISIS.

October 2015 marks the first anniversary of the national unity government and both leaders should make an effort to make the hybrid-presidential system work in order to solve the current political gridlock. If they are unable to come to a solution to end this political impasse, the Taliban and other insurgents groups will have ever greater influence and they will expand their areas of control. As a result, former warlords will form their own militias again to drive the Taliban back. Under these conditions, it wouldn't be long before Afghanistan was in the grips of yet another civil war.


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China

China's Slowdown: An Opportunity To Boost Indo-Africa Ties – Analysis

Tuesday, September 29th, 2015



China's flag. Source: Wikipedia Commons.

As China is confronting property market challenges, overcapacity in industries, debt burden and financial risks, the recent slowdown in the economy and the devaluation of the Chinese currency has heightened major concerns for the various economies across the globe, including Africa.

Over the past decades, China has been a major and the largest trading partner of Africa, with bilateral trade amounting to \$220 billion in 2014. China imports a wide range of products—from copper to oil—from Africa and the continent has become an increasingly important source for feeding the appetite of the consumer-rich Chinese economy. However, the dramatic slowdown of the Chinese economy has left the African region looking vulnerable.

The past few months have seen a significant deterioration in Africa's trade balance with China. In fact, the lower forecast growth rate of 3.1% of China depicts the fragile picture affecting the dynamics of Sino-African relationship.

So, what is the exact impact of the Chinese slowdown on African economies? According to researchers at IMF: "No region may be more affected by the financial meltdown in China than Africa. If China sneezes, Africa can now catch a cold." China

is highly dependent on Africa for its mineral resources, oil and cheap labour. Given the fact that exports to China from Africa accounted for 30% of the region's total exports between 2005 and 2012, African resource exporters are going to suffer negative shock-waves to their industries. Lower demand from China will shrink the economies of Africa and eventually heightened the debt burden.

For the top five exporters-Angola, South Africa, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and the Democratic Republic of Congo-a 1% decline in domestic investment growth would mean a 0.8 percentage point decline in the region's growth. According to Fathom Consulting research, Zambia-which has the large community of Chinese immigrants, having established successful businesses in the retail and the construction industries, followed by South Africa-is most exposed to the Chinese economic slowdown. Last month, with the devaluation of the yuan, South African stock markets suffered from heavy losses with the fall in the value of the rand by almost 8%. In addition to the damage caused on the rand, analysts also noticed the impact of the slowdown on the South African steel industry, which found it difficult to compete against cheaper Chinese steel exports. Moreover, Chinese firms are finding themselves increasingly at odds with their African hosts over environmental and labour issues.

Additionally, the tourism sector of Africa may have to bear the burden of the slowdown. The favourable exchange rate and wildlife has attracted Chinese tourists to Africa. A devaluation of the yuan would lower spending from China and thereby impact tourism. In South Africa, the situation is compounded by new complex visa regulations. For that country, the global volatility would create a double jeopardy for the local tourism industry.

Given these developments, the slowdown may bring benefits to the Indian economy. The India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) in October will be a testing time for India to seek a proactive and meaningful engagement to make the best of the times. Though not as strong as China, India's commerce with Africa has seen considerable progress over the years. In 2013, the trade between both the regions stood at \$70 billion. Nigeria and Angola account for more than a quarter of India's oil and gas imports. India's private sector has established a significant presence in South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania and Mauritius, which has led to strong entrepreneurial ties in sectors such as retail services, mining and commodities trading.

In light of Africa's increasing dependency on and trouble with Chinese actors, African leaders are beginning to look beyond China in an attempt to diversify. Considering that the demand for African resources will get affected from the Chinese slowdown, India and the long-standing presence of Indian businesses in the continent can help Africa deal with the losses. Compared to China, the Indian economy is expected to grow more rapidly, at 7.5%, and offers a large consumer market. With growing energy demands and Make-in-India, further engagement with Africa is possible. Moreover, India provides a useful model for democratic development. The

learning experience from India can help Africa strengthen its judicial system. Additionally, India can be a useful partner to support Africa against terrorism.

The upcoming IAFS will be an occasion to harness this opportunity and a meaningful strategic engagement beneficial to both the countries.

**The author is a Research Assistant, Observer Research Foundation, Delhi*

Courtesy: The Financial Express, September 28, 2015

<http://www.eurasiareview.com/>

Iraq

Analysts Detail Claims That Reports on ISIS Were Distorted

SEPT. 15, 2015



Gen. Lloyd J. Austin III, commander of Centcom, on Capitol Hill on March 3. Credit Gabriella Demczuk/Getty Images

WASHINGTON — A group of intelligence analysts have provided investigators with documents they say show that senior military officers manipulated the conclusions of reports on the war against the Islamic State, according to several government officials, as lawmakers from both parties voiced growing anger that they may have received a distorted picture about the military campaign's progress.


The Pentagon's inspector general, who is examining the claims, is focusing on senior intelligence officials who supervise dozens of military and civilian analysts at United States Central Command, or Centcom, which oversees American military operations against the [Islamic State in Iraq and Syria](#).

Bridget Serchak, a spokeswoman for the Pentagon's inspector general, confirmed that the investigation is focused on Centcom's intelligence command. "The investigation will address whether there was any falsification, distortion, delay, suppression or improper modification of intelligence information," she said in an email on Tuesday.

GRAPHIC

Where ISIS Has Directed and Inspired Attacks Around the World

At least a dozen countries have had attacks since last summer. A Mississippi couple are among the latest in a string of ISIS-related arrests in the United States this year.



[OPEN GRAPHIC](#)

She added that the inquiry would examine any “personal accountability for any misconduct or failure to follow established processes.”

The New York Times reported last month that the investigation had begun, but the scope of the inquiry and the focus of the allegations were unclear. The officials now say that the analysts at the center of the investigation allege that their superiors within Centcom’s intelligence operation changed conclusions about a number of topics, including the readiness of Iraqi security forces and the success of the bombing campaign in Iraq and Syria.

The revisions presented a more positive picture to the White House, Congress and other intelligence agencies, the officials said.

“The senior intelligence officers are flipping everything on its head,” said one government intelligence analyst, who like others spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the matter publicly. The analyst said that the complaints involve the highest-ranking officials in Centcom’s intelligence unit, run by Army Maj. Gen. Steven R. Grove.

The Pentagon's inspector general would not examine disputes over routine differences among analysts, and so it is highly unusual that an investigation would be opened about the intelligence conclusions in an ongoing war. The allegations raise the prospect that military officials were presenting skewed assessments to the White House and lawmakers that were in sharp contrast with the conclusions of other intelligence agencies.

The issue is expected to come up Wednesday when Gen. Lloyd J. Austin III, commander of Central Command, is expected to testify before a Senate panel about the military campaign against the Islamic State.

"We do take seriously any allegations of the mishandling or manipulation of intelligence information for purposes other than getting to ground truth," Representative Adam Schiff of California, the top Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, said Tuesday. "In the wake of the flawed intelligence prior to the [Iraq](#) war, we must make sure that all voices are appropriately considered and that assessments are never again politicized."

Last week, Mr. Schiff said that the intelligence presentations that lawmakers get from spy agencies are in general far better than they were in the period leading up to the start of the Iraq war in 2003, when dissenting views about Iraq's weapons programs were often buried in intelligence reports or ignored. Today, he said, dissenting views are given more prominence in reports.

Disagreements over analytical conclusions are both commonplace and encouraged. Just as in the peer review process in academia, the government wants analysts to consider opposing viewpoints and revise reports as necessary. Analysts who disagree are encouraged to publish rival papers, but changing someone else's conclusion is forbidden.

The matter is complicated because the analysts who made the complaint work for the Defense Intelligence Agency — it was created to be immune from the pressures and biases of the officers leading the war — but are supervised by officers at Centcom. At least one analyst complained to the inspector general in July. Last week, The Daily Beast reported that those complaints were supported by a cadre of more than 50 intelligence agents.

Col. Patrick S. Ryder, a Centcom spokesman, on Tuesday reiterated several points he had made when news of the investigation broke last month. The inspector general has a responsibility to investigate all allegations, he said, and he cannot comment on an ongoing investigation.

But Colonel Ryder said that because many different intelligence agencies provide assessments to policy makers — all derived from a wide range of sources — the sys-

tem is structured to guard against “any single report or opinion unduly influencing leaders and decision makers.”

On Friday, Pentagon investigators held a conference call with members of Congress as a growing, bipartisan chorus of lawmakers expressed concerns about the dispute. One official who listened to the call said it was intended to assure lawmakers that investigators were taking the claims seriously.

That same afternoon, both the Republican chairman of the House oversight committee, Representative Jason Chaffetz of Utah, and a colleague sent letters to Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter and John T. Rymer, the Pentagon inspector general, asking that Pentagon officials brief his committee about the scope of the inquiry and its findings.

“We are deeply concerned about these allegations and want to ensure that intelligence provided to key decision makers properly reflect the expert analysis produced by our Intelligence Community (IC) professionals,” the letter said.

Last summer President Obama authorized a bombing campaign against the Islamic State, a Sunni terrorist group that spun off from Al Qaeda and now controls large areas in Iraq and Syria. Roughly 3,400 American troops are in Iraq advising and training Iraqi forces. The White House has been reluctant, though, to recommit large numbers of ground troops to Iraq after announcing an end to the Iraq war in 2009.

The bombing campaign over the past year has had some success in allowing Iraqi forces to reclaim parts of the country formerly under the Islamic State’s control, but important cities like Mosul and Ramadi remain under the sway of the group. There has been little progress in loosening the group’s hold over large parts of [Syria](#), where the United States has conducted limited airstrikes.

Critics have argued that the bombing alone cannot defeat the Islamic State and have called on the administration to send in more troops. It is not clear if Defense Intelligence Agency analysts have concluded that more American troops would make an appreciable difference.

In testimony on Capitol Hill this year, Lt. Gen. Vincent R. Stewart, the agency’s director, said sending ground troops back into Iraq risked transforming the conflict into one between the West and the Islamic State, which would be “the best propaganda victory that we could give.”

<http://www.nytimes.com/>

Syria

Does Putin want to protect the Assad regime or fight ISIS?

30 September 2015



President Vladimir Putin of Russia did not mince words when he delivered yet another scolding rebuke of U.S. policy towards the Middle East and North Africa at the opening of the U.N. General Assembly on Monday.

Referring to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and to NATO's military intervention, which ultimately led to the removal of the Muammar Qaddafi regime in 2011, Putin argued that the ensuing power vacuums were "immediately" filled by "extremists and terrorists," a clear reference to rise of the Islamic State group, or ISIS, which currently holds onto large swaths of territory in Syria and Iraq.

While Putin asserted that "tens of thousands" of militants operating in Syria hailed from Iraq and Libya, which he unambiguously attributed to U.S. "policies based on self-conceit and belief in one's exceptionality," the Russian leader also indirectly accused Washington and its allies of supporting terrorism. "And now, the ranks of radicals are being joined by the members of the so-called moderate Syrian opposition supported by the Western countries," Putin lamented while seeking to justify his continued military and intelligence support for President Bashar al-Assad of Syria.

As expected, Putin glossed over Assad's brutal crackdown on peaceful protestors demanding greater freedoms and dignity during the early demonstrations against the Alawite regime in 2011.

Putin's address did not surprisingly include any references to Assad's use of chemical weapons against his own people nor his frequent use of barrel bombs against

civilian targets, but his core message instead called on the international community to partner with the embattled Syrian dictator to fight ISIS.

What does Putin want?

Prior to Putin's U.N. address, he left the door open to dispatch Russian troops to Syria to help fight ISIS in a high-profile interview with [CBS News](#), an American TV network. This comes as Russia is building an air base in the city of Latakia while expanding its naval base at Tartous, both within territory controlled by the Assad regime.

For Putin, who repeatedly calls the collapse of the Soviet-Union a "historic mistake," his foreign policy priorities are merely motivated by strengthening Russia's position as a global power but he appears equally committed to chipping away from America's superpower status wherever or whenever he can; be it in Ukraine or in Syria. With ISIS expanding its territorial reach, Putin's U.N. address is hardly another stinging critique of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition's failure to destroy the terrorist organization's infrastructure, but rather an indication of his determination to use military force to protect the survival of the Alawite regime by turning the battle in its favor, if necessary.

Putin's extended commitment to Assad comes only days after his government announced that it would strengthen anti-terrorism cooperation not only with Syria but with Iran and Iraq as well. By tying the governments of Damascus, Baghdad and Tehran together under the auspices of fighting ISIS, Moscow appears more than willing to capitalize on the region's sectarian hatred to help establish itself as an arbiter of power and influence as part of its apparent objective to protect the Assad regime's long-term survival.

This could have profound implications on regional dynamics as the Assad regime would become fully dependent on Moscow for its protection, which could trigger ripple effects on how the weak governments of Iraq and Lebanon respond to a changing order. How Iran, Turkey and Israel will respond, is anyone's guess: What is certain is that Putin is attempting to make the Middle East an even more dangerous region.

Syrian refugees

It was not surprising that Putin's vision for Syria, as outlined in his UN address, did not include any commitments to accept Syrian refugees as he outright rejects European multiculturalism and democratic traditions by favoring authoritarian nationalism where Russia is defined as a country for Russians.

This, coupled with his antipathy for the West and of the United States in particular, explains why Putin likely prefers the Syrian migration crisis to continue as he hopes it will divide Europe and by extension weaken its economy and wealth over time.

While Putin's Russia is genuinely opposed to ISIS, it likely prefers an outdrawn battle between the terrorist organization, Washington and its Arab allies as Moscow hopes to fill vacuums both in Syria and in Ukraine by keeping adversaries entangled in the seemingly never ending war against extremism.

<http://english.alarabiya.net/>

USA

How the US is expanding its fight against extremism in Africa

September 28, 2015

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The opening ceremony of an exercise organized by the US military in Ndjamena, Chad earlier this year to take on Boko Haram. [Reuters/Emmanuel Braun](#)

From the perspective of a US national security specialist, we live in a dark and gloomy world. Numerous worldwide threats exist across almost every part of the planet including China, Iran, North Korea and Russia. This typically puts Africa at the bottom of the pecking order.

But America is taking more notice of the African continent due to the expansion of extremist organisations operating in Africa like al-Qaeda, al-Shabbab, Ansar al-Sharia, al-Murabitun, Boko Haram, Islamic State (IS) and others.


The four main threats

Islamic extremist organisations operating inside Libya, Nigeria, northwest Africa and Somalia pose the largest substantial threats to the African people and their international partners like the US.

The situation in Libya, also referred to as “Somalia on the Med”, has spiralled out of [control](#) since Muammar Gaddafi was ousted in 2011. Fighters from Ansar al-Sharia, IS and others control territory and operate and train with impunity. The US strategy here is to contain the situation by supporting its allies like Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia.

The second main threat comes from Somalia and al-Shabaab. Despite a robust African Union mission supported by a host of African and international countries, the group continues to execute lethal attacks within Somalia’s borders, as well in countries like Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda.

The US strategy is to support partner operations by helping to plan and co-ordinate operations and to support maritime security efforts in the region. For instance, the US [donated](#) US\$92.4 million to the Kenyan Defence Forces in August for soldier training and new equipment acquisitions.



Centre for Intelligence and National Security, University of Oklahoma. Research supported by Defense Intelligence Agency, Grant # HHM402-14-1-0007 (PI: Regens)/Dr. James L. Regens, Regents Professor and Director

The third main threat comes from Northwest Africa and al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). The strategy is to support France. AQIM is France’s number one overseas problem, and they understand this is not a short term fight. In May, the US gave France [US\\$35 million](#) to support their operations in Chad, Niger and Mali, but also to help combat the threat posed by Boko Haram in Nigeria.

Boko Haram recently pledged its [allegiance](#) to IS, meaning its aim is now to establish a caliphate in West Africa rather than just Northern Nigeria.

The US strategy is to help Nigeria and neighbouring countries get back into the fight. Under a new joint US Department of State and US Department of Defense initiative, the Global Security Contingency [Fund](#), the US will contribute US\$40 million to the governments of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. This money is to train and equip their military and civilian forces and to lay the [groundwork](#) for increased cross-border co-operation against Boko Haram.

A last threat, but not at the same level as the other four, is the Lord's Resistance Army ([LRA](#)). Led by Joseph Kony, the LRA is believed to still be carrying out small-scale attacks around the border region of the Central African Republic, DRC, South Sudan and Uganda.

The US first deployed 100 special forces in 2011 to support the search for LRA commanders. The US strategy is to continue [supporting](#) its African partners, particularly Uganda, through a Special Operations Command Africa-led operation.

Barriers to success

Africa's gigantic size makes the operations difficult.

In war, the military needs overhead imagery to provide crucial intelligence. If satellites are not available, drones are the other option. But due to the location of the airports the US military [uses](#) and the sheer distance between areas, flying a drone from one location to another at 80-90 knots can hypothetically mean only 30 minutes to one hour of actual intelligence out of 16 hours flying time.

Troops are too far from each other in Somalia, making communication and movement difficult. In March, the US helped combat the air support problem by donating two Cessna 208B aircraft as a token of appreciation for Uganda's counterterrorism and security efforts.

From an ideological viewpoint, it is hard to fight extremist threats because of their effective narrative. They are fighting under an ideology they [claim is powered by God](#). This is difficult to counter. Negative socioeconomic factors only exacerbate the situation.

All of these operations equate to money. Until 2014 when transitions were made in Afghanistan and Iraq to an "advise and assist" role, most of this money was not going to the US military's African Command but to [Central Command](#) responsible for America's security interests in 20 nations, stretching through the Arabian Gulf region into Central Asia.


Even when money is available and military training of partner nations is going well, what is the US to do if the newly trained and equipped African defence force is used

elsewhere, say to squash internal uprisings?

The good news?

The good news is that the new US defence budget of US\$534 billion is the largest ever. AFRICOM is to get 2% more after a 6.5% cut the year before. The US is expanding African operations. This includes new US military facilities in countries like Niger.

It was announced in August that jet fuel is now available at Zinger Airport in Niger enabling American planes to make pit stops. This is in addition to the new US drone base in Niamey and another refurbished airstrip in the fringe of the Sahara Desert, all closely located to Boko Haram's operating territory.



CentreCentre for Intelligence and National Security, University of Oklahoma. Research supported by Defense Intelligence Agency, Grant # HHM402-14-1-0007 (PI: Regens)./Dr. James L. Regens, Regents Professor and Director

Expect more US-Nigerian military cooperation with Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari, a US Army War College alumnus, in command. Washington refused to sell US -made Cobra fighter-helicopters to Nigeria during President Goodluck Jonathan's presidency due to concerns over the protection of civilians when conducting military operations.

Strides are already being made on certain fronts. In 2008, the LRA had approximately 800 troops. Today it has about 190 to 200. US Special Forces are even using Ugan-

dan music and a famous song, Come Home, [to encourage defections](#).

The FBI [recently](#) sent officers to Uganda to assist with investigations in relation to the International Criminal Court trial of ex-LRA Commander Dominic Ongwen. Of the five indicted LRA commanders only two Ongwen and Joseph Kony are still alive. The latter is still on the run.

This new multifront and multidimensional battle is different from the 1990s when Osama bin Laden was based in Sudan. America is doing what it can to assist and will be doing more. There is increased overall multilateral support, but there can always be more. Africa itself can always do more. Without security there is no [“Africa Rising”](#).

There are three “Ds” of America’s security strategy: diplomacy, development and defence. We cannot downplay the importance of the military and defence, but diplomacy is terribly underfunded. America’s military [has more members](#) in its 158 military bands than diplomats in the State Department in the US and abroad. In the long term, you can’t shoot your way out of this one.

<http://theconversation.com/>

Even with complications, helping Kurds fight ISIS makes sense

September 23, 2015

While the Obama administration haggles over its Syria strategy, a Kurdish militia that claims more than 25,000 battle-hardened fighters is poised several dozen miles north of the Islamic State's capital of Raqqa — ready to roll toward the extremists' sanctuary.

U.S. special operations forces have been providing air support, training and supplies for the Syrian Kurdish group, the People's Protection Units, known as the “YPG” from its Kurdish initials. A resupply shipment of about 100 pallets of arms and other aid has been positioned at a U.S. air base in the Gulf, awaiting Washington authorization for an airdrop to the Kurdish fighters.

“We have no objection to more cooperation with the U.S. and going ahead to Raqqa,” said Saleh Muslim, the co-chairman of the Democratic Union Party, which oversees the militia. But he said that any final assault on Raqqa should come from an estimated 5,000 Arab tribal forces in the region that are working with the YPG. Muslim spoke to me Tuesday by Skype from northeast Syria.

Several U.S. officials say that a White House decision to approve expanded aid has been expected for more than a week. Deliberations were complicated by debate over Russia's recent military moves in Syria, which Moscow describes as an effort to join the fight against the extremists.

“Analysis-paralysis” is how one frustrated U.S. official describes the slow process of approval. Advocates argue that after recent setbacks for a U.S. “train and equip” mission for Syrian moderate forces, the Kurds are the best option against the extremists: Air support wouldn't risk significant U.S. casualties, nor would it violate existing American understandings with Turkey, nor would it threaten the Russians.

Muslim said the YPG force is larger than a U.S. official's estimate of 25,000 but he wouldn't provide a number. U.S. and Kurdish officials said the YPG's power on the ground and its readiness to attack are already well known to the Islamic State militants, who are getting pounded in the Raqqa region by coalition airstrikes and fire-fights with YPG forces.

The YPG fighters get high marks from U.S. commanders. Backed by U.S. air support, they've swept west from their bases in Iraqi Kurdistan and captured a huge swath of northeast Syria, estimated by one official at about 17,000 square kilometers. In January, they won a fierce battle to drive the Islamic State from the border town of Kobani.

U.S. commanders have discussed with their YPG counterparts a move south that would squeeze the Raqqa region, while U.S. and coalition planes and drones attack the city from the air. Once Kurdish fighters had cordoned the areas near Raqqa, the

final assault to clear the city and hold it would be left to a Sunni Arab force. Muslim said that about 3,000 members of the Shammar tribe are fighting alongside the YPG in Hasaka province, northeast of Raqqa, and over 1,000 more Sunnis are fighting closer to the city. But any such assault on Raqqa is probably months away.

The YPG has been the most reliable ally for the U.S.-led coalition in Syria, but the alliance carries several regional complications. First, the militia has close links with the Iraqi Kurdish group known as the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, or PUK, which has fragmented badly in recent years and has growing ties with Iran. Second, the YPG has even tighter bonds with the radical Turkish militia known as the PKK, which the Turkish government regards as a terrorist organization.

Syria has been a nightmare for U.S. policymakers partly because the order of battle there is so tangled. The rampaging YPG is backed by our adversary, Iran, but mistrusted by our ally, Turkey. The U.S. says it wants to work for a diplomatic settlement with help from Russia, which is now sending a significant new military force into northern Syria. Meanwhile, progress on the so-called “southern front,” has been hamstrung by Jordan's reluctance to topple President Bashar al-Assad until it's clearer who will succeed him.

In this fog of policy, the only goal shared by all major players — the U.S., Russia, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Syrian regime itself — is to defeat the Islamic State. The best U.S.-backed fighters against the extremists have been the Syrian Kurds, who say they're ready to do much more, with U.S. support.

“The trust is there between the YPG and American forces,” says Muslim. In Syria, where there often seem to be only bad options, helping the Syrian Kurds fight the Islamic State should be a no-brainer.

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<http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20150923/OPINION04/150929685>

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